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MANAGING URBAN LAND IN CHINA:
THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS ROLE
IN DEVELOPMENT
Mark T. Kremznert
Abstract: This Article examines the emerging legal framework for urban land
management in China with reference to several perspectives on the role of the state in
economic development: modernization, dependency, and statism. A key function of the
urban land management and planning regime in the People's Republic of China is to
promote economic development. Similarly, law and legal institutions in the reform era
are used as an instrument to secure development policies. China's urban land use laws
have the purpose and effect of channeling capital into land development and urban
renewal projects through the commodification of land use rights. While the central state
has achieved some of its development objectives, it has also experienced setbacks and
witnessed an erosion of its control over land uses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Land is a critical natural resource and factor of production, thus the
way in which land is controlled and used affects patterns and processes of
economic and social development. 1 In the People's Republic of China, the
state has had a key role in managing land and guiding the country's
economic and social development. Following Deng Xiaoping's rise to
t Mark T. Kremzner is an attorney with the law firm of Smith Elliott Smith & Garmey in Portland,
Maine. He recently concluded a two year term as Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Asia-Pacific
Law Associate at the University of Victoria.
1 The linkage between land management and development has been widely studied with respect to
agricultural land, but less so with respect to urban land. An example of a detailed agricultural land case
study is DAVID FEENY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRODUCTIVITY: THAI AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT,
1880-1975 (1982). Feeny's study draws upon the works of Douglass North, which argue that well defined
property rights in land and other resources are necessary for economic and social development.
DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1973); DOUGLASS
CECIL NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
2 The responsibility of the state for the economy is provided for in various places of the current
Constitution of the People's Republic of China. ZHONGHIJA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (1982) [P.R.C.
CONST. (1982)], translated in China L. for Foreign Bus. (CCH Australia Ltd.) 14-500 (1997). Article 7 of
the 1982 Constitution proclaims "The state owned economy is the leading force in the national economy.
The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the state owned economy." Article 8 declares that the
state encourages, guides and assists the growth of the collective economy, and Article 11 declares that the
state guides, assists and supervises the individual economy. The state and collectives formally hold title to
all land throughout the country. Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution reads in part as follows: "Land in the
cities is owned by the state. Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those
portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law."
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power in the late 1970s, new policies were implemented that altered the
course of the nation's economic development path and the way in which
rural and urban land was held and managed. The reform of the land
management regime has contributed significantly to the nation's economic
growth and development. Just as the de-collectivization of rural land led
to great increases in agricultural output, 3 so too has urban land reform
accelerated the transformation of China's cities and urban economy. This
Article examines the emerging legal framework for urban land
management with reference to the state's pursuit of economic development
objectives.4
II. PARADIGMS ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The degree to which states chart and direct the course of
development has been the object of much study and analysis. Several
paradigms on the role of the state in economic development are described
below and will be used as reference points to assess the role of the central
state in managing urban land in China. While some of the basic
assumptions and analytical methodologies utilized by each paradigm
remain open to debate, they do provide a useful means for analyzing the
role of the state in promoting and directing development.
3 See, e.g., Roy Prosterman et al., Can China Feed Itself., Sci. AMER., Nov. 1996, at 90; Wang
Zuo, Zhonguo nongcun tudichan chuan zhidu xin lun [New Views on the System of Property Rights in
Rural Land in China], 5 ZHONGGUO NONGCUN JINGJI [CHINA RURAL ECONOMY] 16 (1994).
4 The Chinese state is distinguished by some political scientists from the Chinese Communist Party
(hereafter CCP or Party) and refers to those institutions and government officials responsible for
administrative, judicial and legislative affairs. See STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Victor
Nee & David Mozingo eds., 1983). Other scholars find no significance in drawing distinctions between
the CCP and the state, because of their tight integration. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL
OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES (1988). Unless otherwise
noted, this Article does not draw a sharp distinction between the state and the Party. There is also much
recent scholarship on the distinction between the state and the local state. See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS-
POLITICS, TRADE AND REGIONALISM (David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1994); CHANGING
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN CHINA: REFORM AND STATE CAPACITY (Jia Hao & Lin Zhimin eds., 1994).
The distinction between central and local is problematic in discussions of urban land law. There are four
levels of government in China each with legislative or rulemaking authority and Party and government
institutions. Within a city all four levels of Party and government institutions may own land and/or hold
land use rights. The four levels of government in descending order of authority are: national, or more
accurately central (zhongyang), provincial (sheng), county (xian), and municipal or city (shi). Depending
upon the size or status of a city, it may have a higher degree of authority than a county and contain
counties within its administrative authority. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing all contain
numerous counties and have the same degree of authority as provincial governments.
VOL. 7 No. 3
E9MANAGING URBAN LAND IN CHINA
A. The Modernization Paradigm
Efforts by Western social scientists in the early 1950s to identify the
reasons why some countries had undergone more rapid industrialization
and urbanization than others focused on the conditions and experience of
Western Europe and North America.5 Drawing upon ideas of evolution,
modernity (as opposed to traditional values), and social change,
modernization theorists conceived of development as an irreversible
process whereby countries progress from a backward or undeveloped
stage to an advanced or developed stage.6 In adopting the assumptions of
liberal economic thought, the modernization paradigm maintains that free
markets optimize efficiency in resource allocation thereby promoting
growth. Government involvement in the market place often has been
viewed as little more than an interference that distorts prices, hampers
transactions and retards growth. For example, in advising China on urban
land management reform, the World Bank has called upon the central
government to "remove obstacles to market reform and deregulate urban
planning."
7
The theoretical works and policy advice of law and development
advocates have been used widely to justify and implement modernization
programs.8  Before being subjected to serious criticism in the 1970s, the
presumptions and proposals of the law and development movement were
embraced by Western government foreign aid programs and international
donor agencies in the 1960s.9 The movement emphasized the positive role
that legal reform could play in economic and political development
through the transfer of Western legal ideas and institutions.10 According
Modernization thought has been greatly influenced by the works of Max Weber. He attempted to
show that the norms associated with the Protestant work ethic promoted economic accumulation and
growth, whereas other social systems were based on norms and values that inhibited economic growth.
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958).
6 See W.W. RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NoN-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1960)
(regarding the five stages of economic growth); Raymond Vernon, International Investment and
International Trade in the Product Cycle, 80 Q.J. ECON. 190 (1966) (regarding product cycle theory).
7 WORLDBANK, CHINA: URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT IN AN EMERGING MARKETECONOMY 31 (1993).
8 John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and
Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AMER. J. COMp. L. 457 (1977).
9 N. Yasuda, Law and Development in ASEAN Countries, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
IN ASEAN COUNTRIES (T.M. Rahdie & N. Yasuda eds., 1991). For a criticism of the law and
development by one of its former proponents, see David M Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in
Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 1974 WIs. L. REV 1062, 1072-79.
10 Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. & Soc'Y REV. 29 (1969).
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to law and development advocates, the rational legal institutions of the
West (which encouraged long term investments, stimulated entrepreneurial
activity, and provided greater certainty for private sector transactions)
could be transplanted in less developed countries ("LDCs") to promote
their growth and development."I
The law and development movement currently is experiencing a
limited renaissance in China. Law and development scholars and policy
analysts from the West and China posit that economic development can be
promoted and a socialist market economy established by setting up new
rational legal institutions and promulgating comprehensive laws. 12  This
view has been embraced by many of China's current leaders, who
repeatedly have stated that law is an essential agent in moving China away
from a planned economic system and towards a new socialist market
economy. 13  At the past two National Congresses of the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP"), Party leaders detailed the way in which law
should be used to manage and regulate various facets of society and the
economy in a bid to modernize the country. 14
Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Emile Durkheim, all of whom analyzed social institutions and the rise of
capitalism in Western Europe, are cited frequently by contemporary law and development scholars. In
particular, they owe an intellectual debt to Weber who demonstrated that the formal rational legal systems of
Western European states provided predictable conditions for market transactions that facilitated investment and
contributed to economic growth. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Witich
eds., 1968). For an analysis of Weber's influence on law and development theory see David M. Trubek Max
Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIs. L. REv. 720.
12 See, e.g., WANG CHENGUANG, SUIZHI SHICHANG JINwI DE JIANzi JUBU WANSHAN XIANGYING DE
FALU TIXI [THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARKET ECONOMY AND THE GRADUAL PERFECTION OF THE LEGAL
SYSTEM]. For an account of a recent United Nations Development Program led effort to transplant law to
China see LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR MARKET REFORM-SOME LESSONS FROM CHINA (Robert B.
Seidman et al., eds., 1997).
13 Chen Yingge et al., Wunian nei xingcheng shehui zhuyi shichang jing/ falu tixi kuangfia
[Forming the Framework of the Legal System of the Socialist Market Economy in Five Years], T4
JINGJIFA [ECONOMIC LAW] 11 (1993). See also Chairman Qiao Shi Emphasizes Lawmaking for the
Socialist Market Economy at the Eighth National People's Congress Standing Committee, Second
Session, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], July 3, 1993, at 1 (discussing the statements of Qiao Shi,
former chair of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on using law to establish a socialist
market economy.); Pitman B. Potter, Peng Zhen: Evolving Views on Party Organization and Law, in
CHINA'S ESTABLISHMENT INTELLECTUALS 21-50 (Carol Lee Hanrin & Timothy Cheek eds., 1986)(discussing the statements of Peng Zhen, Qiao's Shi's predecessor as Chair of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee). For a succinct discussion of the instrumental uses of law in China in the
post-Mao era see BARRETTr L. MCCORMICK, POLITICAL REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: DEMOCRACY AND
BUREAUCRACY IN A LENINIST STATE (1990).
14 Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist
Market Economic Structure, translated and reprinted in CHINA ECON. NEWS (Supplement No. 12), Nov.
29, 1993 [hereafter 14th National Congress Decision]. The 14th National Congress Decision called for
the legal codification of the rules governing the socialist market economy and urged Party cadres to learn
how to manage the economy by legal means.
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B. The Dependency Paradigm
The dependency paradigm emerged in reaction to the modernization
paradigm and was inspired by classical Marxist thought. Whereas modernization
theory explains that development occurs as the result of factors internal to the
economy and society of a country, early dependency theorists claimed that
underdevelopment is the result of external capitalist forces.'5 Early dependency
theories were largely based on a world system perspective that placed the
advanced capitalist nations at the core and countries with a colonial legacy or
other exploitative history at the periphery. This structure is believed to
perpetuate underdevelopment because capital is drawn out of the periphery and
accumulates in the core thereby further polarizing the global economy.
16
Responding to criticisms from both ends of the political spectrum on the
lack of empirical rigor in their early work, dependency theorists modified their
views in the 1970s and 1980s.' 7  Cardoso put forth the notion of "dependent
development," which explained that an LDC can develop when mutually
advantageous conditions exist for both it and the partnered advanced economy.18
By contrast, Wallerstein's world systems analysis explained that limited
opportunities existed for LDCs to develop.19 Later dependency scholars utilized
these and other theoretical models to demonstrate through numerous empirical
studies that direct foreign investment, trade and aid decreased long term growth
and increased inequality.20 In general these studies demonstrated that LDCs
15 The initial inspiration from classical Marxist thought was rooted in Marx's contention that the
forces of imperialism will bring about a capitalist stage of development. The early dependency theorists
argued that the interactions between the capitalist core and LDCs did not bring about a capitalist mode of
production but rather led to the extraction of accumulated funds and resources by the capitalist powers.
PAUL BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957).
16 See, e.g., ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CHILE AND BRAZIL (1967).
17 For example Bill Warren, a Marxist scholar, persuasively argued that some former colonial
subjects underwent industrialization. See Bill Warren, Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization, 81
NEW LEFr REV. 3 (1973).
'8 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Political
Implications, in AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL 142 (Alfred Stepan ed., 1973). See also PETER B. EVANS,
DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL CAPITAL IN BRAZIL
(1979); HYUN-CHIN LIM, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA, 1963-1979 (1985).
'9 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY (1979). For a critique of
Wallerstein's views see Theda Skocpol, Wallerstein's Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical
Critique, 82 AMER. J. SOC. 1075 (1977).
20 There is a vast literature on dependency that investigates the influence and effect of foreign capital in
many nations. For a survey of the academic literature see ROBERT A. PACKENHAM, THE DEPENDENCY
MOVEMENT: ScHOLARsHIP AND POLmCS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (1992). Much of the research for the
formulation of dependency theory was based on conditions in Latin America. For an overview of some of the
manifestations of dependency in general see, VOLKER BORNSCHIER & CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN,
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became reliant on foreign trade channels and overseas capital sources in the form
of bank loans, direct investment, and donor aid. The influential role of foreign
capital led to the co-opting or corruption of local elites and domestic institutions,
which became instruments to further promote the interests of foreign capital.2'
An alternative view is that dependency relationships are the product of domestic
policies and not the result of global structural relationships.22
Legal institutions in particular were seen as promoting and enhancing the
domination of foreign capital, and thus the law and development movement came
under attack for breeding underdevelopment. 23 Imported legal forms were used
to legitimate resistance to change and to suppress reformist elements that aimed
to raise the economic and social conditions for a broader spectrum of society.24
While the governing regimes of many LDCs were sufficiently strong to retain
political power at home, they remained dependent upon foreign capital and were
unable to effectively manage or regulate their national resources or assets.25
Finally, laws and legal institutions that privatized economic transactions and
limited state involvement in commercial affairs were seen as inhibiting the ability
of the central state to control private enterprise and foreign capital.26
C. The Statist Paradigm
The statist paradigm holds that the state is a vital factor in
promoting development. Statism reversed the negative attitudes towards
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1985); Robert W. Jackman, Dependence on
Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World, 34 WORLD POL 175 (1982).
21 RICHARD ROBISON, INDONESIA: THE RISE OF CAPITAL (1986).
22 Stephan Haggard, The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System, 38 WORLD
POLITICS 343 (1986).
23 For a more in depth analysis of the law and development movement and how it may perpetuate
underdevelopment and dependency see Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of
Dependency Theory, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 723 (1980).
24 For discussion on how transplanted Japanese and American law was used to expropriate the most
valued farm lands in South Korea, see David I. Steinberg, Law, Development, and Korean Society, 3 J. COMP.
ADMIN. 215 (1971). See also Thomas M. Franck New Development: Can American Legal Institutions Help
Developing Countries, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 767 (explaining that the 1971 coup in Turkey arose as a result of the
way the judiciary frustrated economic reform and development plans); Daniel Lev, Judicial Authority and the
Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtsstaat, 13 L. & Soc'Y REV. 37 (1978) (discussing elite subjugation of reform
efforts); Neal A. Roberts, The Supreme Court in a Developing Society: Progressive or Reactionary Force?: A
Study of the Privy Purse Case in India, 20 AM. J. COmp. L. 79 (1971) (describing how the Supreme Court of
India promotedthe interests of wealthy, empowered elites).
25 JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA (1980).
26 Alan Stone, The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure Archetype, 19 L. &
Soc'YREV. 39 (1985).
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the state held by modernization and dependency theorists and emphasized
the advantages that flow from states that take an active role in formulating
and implementing growth strategies. The intellectual roots of the statist
paradigm are based in part upon the works of Gerschenkorn, who argued
that late developing states needed to intervene more strenuously to ensure
rapid industrialization and catch up to advanced economies. 27 A leading
reason for this is said to be the inability of the private sector in LDCs to
organize and accumulate the capital necessary for building national
infrastructure.
Statists have tended to focus their work on identifying those factors
that are most critical for achieving swift and sustained growth. The East
Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) have been the center of much
attention. Some studies emphasize that the strength of the state is
important for bargaining with other states and organizations to improve
opportunities for growth, win acceptance for domestic trade and
investment policies, and obtain support or aid.28 Others point to the role
of the state in providing and improving infrastructure, encouraging foreign
investment, adjusting fiscal flows, and directing funds into targeted
industries to enhance growth. 29 Government policies that match domestic
resources and production facilities with global markets may also improve
growth rates. 30 Finally, the mixture of both import substitution and export
production have been shown to yield beneficial industrial diversification
and place a nation on a steady path of development.31
With respect to land management, statist policies have been
employed to improve land for industrial interests, encourage the
construction of housing and commercial space, and to promote the growth
of the real estate sector. Singapore and Hong Kong have closely
controlled land use to guide urban growth, and have regarded urban land
2' ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1962).
See also BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985) (demonstrating that the content
of national policies and the extent of state involvement yields different socio-economic results).
28 ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, THE WEAK IN THE WORLD OF THE STRONG: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1977); Steve Chan, The Mouse That Roared: Taiwan's Management of
Trade Relations With the United States, 20 COMP. POL. STUD. 251 (1987).
29 STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (1990); CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1925-1975 (1982).
30 MANUFACTURING MIRACLES: PATHS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA
(Gary Gereffi & Donald Wyman eds., 1990).
31 See, e.g., ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990).
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management as critical for their socio-economic development. 32  In
Taiwan the central government has actively managed the transformation of
land from agricultural to industrial purposes through a legal framework.33
The Taiwan legislature passed laws to regulate the requisition of land from
farmers for industrial purposes, bar land speculation, and encourage
entrepreneurs to invest in land for industrial purposes. This legal regime
led to the establishment of special export processing zones, the hi-tech
Hsinchu Science Park, and more than sixty-eight industrial parks. 34
In summary, the role of the state and law in the development
process is viewed differently by each of the paradigms. In contrast to the
modernization paradigm, which views the state as a disruptive influence
on markets and economic growth, and the dependency paradigm, which
views the state as little more than an agent for the dominant classes and
commercial interests, statism considers the state to be a key factor in
promoting growth. The law and development movement, which contains a
number of assumptions rooted in the modernization paradigm, sees law as
critical to the establishment of a framework to ensure sustained socio-
economic progress. Critics of the movement reject those assumptions and
assert that Western, liberal based legal institutions have brought about
widespread social and economic injustice.
III. BACKGROUND ON THE URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT REGIME
A. Ownership and Control of Real Property
After coming to power in 1949 the first tasks of the CCP in the cities
were to consolidate political control and transform the pre-revolutionary
bourgeoisie, consumer cities (xiaofei chengshi) to producer cities (shengchan
chengshi).35 State owned enterprises and urban collectives, controlled by
various central and local level governments, slowly acquired large amounts of
32 MANUEL CASTELLS ET AL., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING POLICY IN THE ASIAN
PACIFIC RIM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND SHENZHEN SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE, MONOGRAPH 37 (June 1988).
33 Martha Fitzpatrick Bishai, The Development of Industrial Land in Taiwan: A Legal Framework
for State Control, 26 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 53 (1991); INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BUREAU, MINISTRY OF
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, ROC, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS IN TAIWAN (1986).
3 See Bishai, supra note 33, at 58.
5 KAM WING CHAN, CITIES WITH INVISIBLE WALLS, REINTERPRETING URBANIZATION IN POST-1949
CHINA 10(1994). Ironically, the successes that the CCP had in industrializing cities led to a host of other
problems. Expanded industrial capacity required more housing for workers and infrastructure systems,
both of which were neglected.
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urban real estate. Party and government authorities requisitioned and
allocated land to them free of charge according to economic plans drawn up
by the Economic Planning Commission. 36 This practice led to widespread
hoarding of land because enterprises and collectives typically requested larger
allocations of land than actually needed and had no incentive to economize.
While some land users had a surplus, others suffered shortages. The
prohibition on land transfers and the absence of a land market exacerbated
this imbalance in supply and demand.37 Although a black market did exist for
urban land, the penalties for land transactions discouraged most local Party
cadres and enterprise directors.
While many urban dwellers retained their ownership interests in urban
real estate, those labeled as class or state enemies had their property
confiscated or reclaimed because of the failure to pay "back taxes. 38 By the
late 1950s the state was considered to be the formal owner of nearly all urban
real property. However, it was not until the promulgation of the 1982
Constitution that the law formally provided for state ownership of urban
land. 39 Actual control of urban real property was divided among various
central government ministries and agencies, and provincial, county and
municipal governments.
B. Urban Land Management
Throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet theory and practices
on urban land management had an important influence on the form and
development of Chinese cities.4 0 This led to the formation of egalitarian and
proletariat style cities, characterized by many uniform, self-sufficient
neighborhoods centered around a particular enterprise or danwei (work
36 Xiao Yang, Tansho shiying tudi shiyongquan churang xuyao de guihua gongshuo fangfa,
[Investigation of the Planning Method Necessary for Granted Land Use Rights] 1 CHENGSHI GUIHUA
[CITY PLANNING REVIEW] 11 (1993); State Land Administration Bureau, Tudi guanli tizhi he shiyong
shidu gaige de changshi yu tanshao [Tentative Reforms of the Land Administration and Use System], in
ZHONGGUO JINOJI TIZHI GAIGE NIANQIAN [CHINA ECONOMIC REFORM ALMANAC] (1991).
37 SONG JIATAI, ZONGTI CHENGSHI GUIHUA [COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLANNING] (1985).
38 SHENGWUYUAN [POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION], GUANwu MUOSHOU zHANFAN HANJIAN
GUANLIAO ZIBENJIA JI FANGEMING FENZI CAICHAN DE ZHISHI [INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE
CONFISCATION OF THE PROPERTY OF WAR PRISONERS, TRAITORS, BUREAUCRATIC CAPITALISTS AND
COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES] (Feb. 4, 1951), reprinted in JIANMING FANGDICHAN SHENPAN SHOUCE
[CONCISE JUDICIAL HANDBOOK ON REAL ESTATE] 615 (Supreme People's Court Civil Law Bureau and
People's Legal Publishing House eds., 1995).
39 See supra note 2.
40 See Q. SONG, XIANDAI CHENGSHI TUDI LIYONG GUIHUA [MODERN URBAN LAND USE
PLANNING] (1992).
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unit).4' Commercial areas were neglected and declined in terms of area and
density.42 What available funds were not expended on building industrial
capacity were spent on the construction of public places and Party and
government buildings.43
Urban land management took a took step backwards during the Great
Leap Forward (1958-1961) and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when the
urban planning profession, comprised chiefly of architects, was criticized and
dismantled.44 During those periods most municipal governments had little or
no role in land management and ceased to enact or enforce land use and
planning regulations. Most matters concerning urban land were determined
by Party officials at the municipal level or higher. Directives and decrees
were circulated among those officials with a need to know or act upon their
contents. Urban land planning was integrated into economic planning and
was concerned primarily with the siting of manufacturing plants. The
emphasis on creating producer cities resulted in a disproportionately high
percentage of urban land being used for industrial purposes.45 Furthermore,
the lack of coordination among enterprises and government units in control of
land resulted in many incompatible land uses, infrastructure failures and
environmental problems.46
Urban infrastructure deteriorated due to the lack of incentives and
capital funds for maintenance and repair. Housing in particular suffered as
widespread shortages arose from the 1960s onward. Housing was considered
a consumptive good, not a productive good, therefore capital funds seldom
were invested in housing construction or improvement. 47  Furthermore,
because rental rates were set below replacement costs, local governing units
41 C.K. Leung & Y.W. Poon, Urban Land Use of China's Medium Cities: A Case Study of Foshan,
1(1) ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 1 (1982).
42 Wu Jin, Historical Development of Chinese Urban Morphology, 8 PLANNING PERSPECTIVES
20, 42-50 (1993).
43 See ALFRED SCHINZ, CITIES IN CHINA (1989) (describing and illustrating the formalistic, grand
style and designs for public buildings and spaces).
44 Hok Lin Leung, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Planning Profession in China, CHINA CITY
PLAN. REV., Sept. 1989, at 59, 62; Yichun Xie & Frank J. Costa, Urban Design Practice in Socialist
China, 13 THIRD WORLD PLAN. REV. 279 (1991).
41 In 1981, 27.6% of the land area in China's largest cities contained industrial users. In contrast,
industrial users in Japan for the same period occupied only 10.5% of urban land. Policy Framework for
the Development ofReal Estate and the Real Estate Industry in China, CITY PLAN. REV., Mar. 1993, at 2,
11 [hereinafter Policy Framework].
46 Ye Laisong, Uniform Planning, Rational Layout and Integrated Development and Adequate
Provision ofAuxiliary Services, 5 CHENG XIANG JIANSHE [URBAN RURAL CONSTRUCTION] 7, 8 (1987).
47 Gill Chin Lim & Man Hyung Lee, Political Ideology and Housing Policy in Modern China, 8
ENV'T PLAN. C. GOV'T & POL'Y 477 (1990).
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could not collect sufficient funds to maintain or repair existing housing. Lack
of funds for the development and maintenance of infrastructure further
compounded these problems.48 From the early 1970s to mid 1980s, urban
construction was financed primarily from a portion of the moneys collected
from the industrial and commercial tax, a tax on the profits of urban based
state owned enterprises, and a public works surcharge on utility fees.49
With the establishment of the open door policy and the initiation of
market experiments, new financing arrangements for the development and
improvement of urban real property were tested in several cities by municipal
governments. 50  Guangzhou unsuccessfully implemented a program for the
collection of land use fees to subsidize the construction of new housing in
1978.51 Fushun, Liaoning Province introduced a land management system in
1983 that later received much attention. In an effort to economize and
rationalize land use, city officials first conducted a land survey and then
instituted a land use fee schedule. 52 More than 13.6 million square meters of
land that had been improperly occupied or utilized (approximately eleven
percent of the total area of the city) were turned over to the municipal
authorities and redistributed according to a new master plan.53 Furthermore,
the thirteen million RMB collected from the initial assessment of annual land
use fees were used to fund new construction projects.54 By 1984 many cities
throughout China were establishing land use fee systems based on the Fushun
experience.55 In late 1987, Shenzhen officials pushed urban land reform
48 Ye Rutang, Enhance Awareness, Maintain Reform and Expedite Urban construction in China, 1
CHENG XIANG JIANSHE [URBAN RURAL CONSTRUCTION] 6, 9 (1987); Tao Zengji, Problems of Urban
Construction and Finance: A View of the City Structure of Shanghai, in ZHONGGUO CAIZHENG WENTI
[CHINA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS] 690 (Ministry of Finance ed., 1981).
49 Cal Yuzhi, Woguo chengshi weihu jianshe zijin de lishi yanbian, [Historical Trends in the
Construction Funds for Maintaining Our Country's Cities] 4 CAIZHEN6 [FINANCE] 25, 27-28 (1985).
50 The reform of the urban land management system involved a restructuring of property rights in
real property and a reappraisal of China's economy system. The search and experimentation for new
approaches towards managing urban land occurred simultaneously with the debates over ownership and
management of state owned enterprises and the extent to which central planning should be retained or
utilized. For a more detailed discussion of the debates on these issues see YAN SUN, THE CHINESE
REASSESSMENT OF SOCIALISM, 1976-1992 (1995).
s1 Wang Xianjin, Lun chengshi tudi shiyong zhidu gaige, [A Discussion on the Reform of the Urban
Land Use System] 9 QIUSHI [SEEK TRUTH] 36 (1988).
52 Zhou Cheng et al., Chengshi tudi youchang shiyung shizai bixing [Payment for Land Use in
Cities is Imperative], 6 JINGJI LILUN YU JINGJI GUANLI [ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT] 65 (1987).
53 Li Ning, Chengshi tudi guanlishidushang de yixiang tupo [A Breakthrough in the System of
Urban Land Management] 7 CHENGXIANG JIANSHE [URBAN AND RURAL CONSTRUCTION] 17, 20 (1985).
14 See id.
55 Chengxiang jianshe xinsi [Urban and Rural Construction News] 12 CHENGXIANG JIANSHE
[URBAN AND RURAL CONSTRUCTION] 47 (1985).
JUNE 1998
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
further by holding the first auction in China for the use rights to a parcel of
land, even though no national legislation existed that permitted them to do
so. 56  As calls were being made to implement land use fees nationwide,
debates continued on whether the urban land reforms should proceed or be
brought to a halt. 57  Party and government leaders were divided over a
number of ideologically sensitive issues concerning land ownership,
commodification of land, and rent.
IV. UNLEASHING THE PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF URBAN LAND THROUGH
ITS COMMODIFICATION
A. Ideological and Political Considerations
Classic Marxist doctrine holds that land is not a commodity and has no
exchange value, because it exists naturally and is not the product of labor.
58
This notion was the ideological justification for prohibitions on the sale or
lease of land during the Maoist era, and the reason why land was transferred
free of charge by central planning authorities. For conservative Party
ideologues, ideas of land leases and sales of land use rights was antithetical to
Marxist-Maoist ideology. 59 Having the state lease land would be tantamount
to the state assuming the status of a landlord. The historic mission of the
Party had been to guard the population from exploitation by landlords. If the
Party condoned the leasing of land by the state and the reappearance of
landlordism, it risked forfeiting its legitimacy.
By the mid-1980s, the issue of urban land leasing was being openly
debated in academic journals and the media. Reformers justified land leases
and the imposition of land use fees by reinterpreting Marx's writings on land
56 The auction was held in December 1987 and involved the sale of approximaely 10,000 square
yards of residentially zoned land to a local development enterprise. Shanghai municipal officials
auctioned the first use rights to a parcel of land for hard currency in 1988 to Japanese based Sun
Enterprises Ltd. See Harold Rose, Shenzhen Encourages Land Auctions Through Adoption of Liberal
Policies, ASIAN WALL ST. J., 1989 at 12.
57 For example, the director of the urban construction bureau in the Ministry of Construction called
for deepening the implementation of the land use fee program as soon as possible. See Ye Weijun, Yao
zhuahao chengshifichu sheshi defianshe [Seize Upon Construction of Basic Infrastructure for Cities] 10
CHENGXIANG JIANSIE [URBAN AND RURAL CONSTRUCTION] 7 (1985).
58 Marx put forward his views on land rent in the early 1860's in THEORIES OF SURPLUS VALUE later
in 1894 in CAPITAL III. See KARL MARX, THEORIES OF SURPLUS VALUE (G.A. Bonners & Emile Bums
trans., 1951); CAPrrAL III (Pelican Marx Library edition). For a discussion of Maoist interpretations of
Marx's view on land rent see Chen Xiuhua, A Discussion of the Commodification of Land for Urban
Construction, 61 JIANGHAN LUNTAN [JIANGHAN TRIBUNE] 1 (1985).
59 Stephen Morgan, China: Ideology on the Block, FAR E. ECON. REv., July 14, 1988, at 22.
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rent.6" They asserted that urban land could have exchange value because of
the transformation in its use in an urban economy.61  Presuming that urban
land had value it logically followed, according to some theorists, that the state
legitimately could grant rights to use a parcel of land in exchange for payment
equivalent to the transformed value.62 While this would result in the
commodification of the use rights to land, its ownership technically would
remain under the ownership of the "whole people," or the state. This
formulation also proved to be in accord with the final provisions of the then
newly promulgated 1986 General Principles of the Civil Law, which holds
that the right to use property is one of four constituent elements that comprise
property ownership.6 3
The increasing momentum in support of the commodification of land
use rights coincided with calls to accord the real estate industry independent
status. A number of ministries and agencies lobbied in favor of the real estate
industry. Chief among them were the Ministry of Construction ("MOC") and
6o Qi Mingshen, Dui chengshi tudi shangpin de zhiyi [Doubts Concerning Urban Land as a
Commodity], 61 JIANGHAN LUNTAN [JIANGHAN TRIBUNE] 4 (1985).
61 Some writers argued that urban land, while not a commodity, could contain value because it had
labor applied to it when it was transformed from agricultural land. See id. at 10. Other writers viewed
urban land as being composed of two essential elements: a natural resource and a product of human labor.
The labor applied to land gave that element of land a certain value which could provide a basis for
establishing price in an exchange transaction. Chen Xiuhua, Lun jianzhu diduan de shangpinxing [A
Discussion on the Commodification of Construction Land Sector], 61 JIANGHAN LUNTAN [JIANGHAN
TRIBUNE] 1, 2 (1985). Additional support and justification for the commodification of land use rights
came from policy researchers working on rural land issues. The transferability of land was considered
critical for sustaining growth in the agricultural sector and for shifting some land into industrial uses to
spur the growth of small towns and cities. See Du RUNSHENG, ZHONGGUO XL4NG JINGJi GAIGE, [CHINESE
RURAL ECONOMIC REFORM] 228-34 (1985). Du likened the use right of land to a contractual right, rather
than a property right, in an attempt to avoid comparisons with private property. Id. at 230.
62 Liang Zhisen, Woguo dichan ye gaige de tantao [An Inquiry into the Reform of Our Country's Real
Estate Business] 4 NANHUA SHIFAN DAXUEXUEBAO ISOUTH CHINA NORMAL UNIVERSrry JOURNAL] 17 (1985).
63 Article 71 of the GPCL provides that ownership is comprised of four constituent powers and
functions (quanneng): possession (zhanyou), use (shiyong), disposition (chufen de zhangli), and right to
benefit (shouyiquan). ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHE GUOMIN FATONGZE, 1986 [hereinafter GPCL],
translated in CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS., 119-150. During the same time of the debates on land rent,
legal scholars 'and others were attempting to reach a consensus on the types of property rights to receive
legal recognition. At the Thirteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress ("NPC") in November 1985, Wang Hanbin, then Chair of the Committee for Law Building,
emphasized the need for recognizing the right to use land in accord with a contract (chengbao quan) to
further economic reform. See Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China's
General Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and Beyond, 52 LAw &
CONT. PROBS. 177, 188 (1989). This approach ultimately proved acceptable because it did not run counter
to the inviolable socialist principle of state ownership and conformed to Marxist theory on ownership,
which draws a distinction between the legal and economic functions of property. The economic function
of capital, according to Marx, was realized when lesser property rights were distinguished from the
ownership of capital. Id. at 189.
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the Ministry of Finance, both of which stood to gain economically and
politically from the legalization of real estate markets. By late 1984 the State
Planning Commission ("SPC")64 granted the real estate industry independent
status, which led to the creation of new regulatory institutions to oversee
construction enterprises, land management agencies, and associated financial
and administrative organizations.65 In 1987 the real estate industry got
another boost when it was declared to be a production, as opposed to
consumption, based industry.6 6 This pronouncement led to an increase in the
availability of investment funds for land development and construction
projects. The enhanced status of the real estate industry and the government
organs that regulated it strengthened the political clout of those favoring the
commodification of land use rights.
Another divisive issue surrounding the urban land commodification
debate was the role of foreign capital.67 A conservative faction of Party
members led by Chen Yun strongly opposed the sale of land use rights or
leasing of land to foreign investors. They claimed that a policy allowing
foreigners to obtain property rights in Chinese soil would be tantamount to
the re-establishment of foreign concessions of the treaty port era.68
Somewhat less xenophobic opponents of land commodification argued that
foreign investment in land was part of an erroneous internationally oriented
development policy that would result in dependence upon foreign markets
and capital.69  These voices were concerned that China's enterprises and
64 The State Planning Commission had a critical role in central economic planning during the
Maoist era. In particular it determined input (including capital investment, land and labor) and output
requirements for enterprises and collectives. It also played a key role in locating enterprises, allocating
land and providing infrastructure services. Thus, the decisions and actions of the SPC have significant
impact upon urban planning and land use issues. With the decline of central economic planning, the SPC
has seen its influence erode, relative to other governmental organs and ministries. For more on the SPC
see THOMAS P. LYONS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND PLANNING IN MAOIST CHINA (1987).
65 Policy Framework, supra note 45, at 3.
66 See id.67 In contrast rural land management reform explicitly ruled out the possibility of a role for foreign
capital. Foreigners were only granted permission to invest in rural land for the purpose of aiding
agricultural development in late 1996. Tom Korski, Crop Land Open to Foreigners, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 12, 1996, at 3.
68 See id. See also Wu Jincai, Invigorate the Land, Xinhua Domestic Service, Sept. 5, 1992,
translated in FEDERAL BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-CHINA DAILY REPORT [hereafter FBIS-CHINA
DAILY REP.], Sept. 9, 1992, at 41.
69 For views opposed to an outward looking development model in China, see Liu Changli, Jinkou
tidai shi woguo ganchao shijie gongye daguo de zhangchi [Import Substitution is China's Long Term
Strategy for Catching Up with or Surpassing the Developed Countries], 8 JINGJI YANJIu [ECONOMIC
RESEARCH] 34 (1987); Xia Shen, Lun zhongguo waixiang fingii fajan de zhanlue xuanze [The Strategic
Options of the Development of China's Externally Oriented Economy], 9 CAIMAO JINOJI [FINANCE AND
TRADE ECONOMICS] 11 (1988).
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collectives lacked the financial resources to purchase land use rights.
Domestic interests consequently would be forced to scale back or even
terminate their operations in the face of high land costs, and foreign
businesses would gain a dominant position.7'
Those favoring foreign investment in urban land argued that allowing
foreigners the right to use land would be a good way to encourage the flow of
much needed hard currency into China. In 1985 then Premier Zhao Ziyang
publicly promoted the idea of land leases to foreigners as a way of raising
funds for capital investments. 71 He was supported by a number of local Party
secretaries in Shanghai and other cities who either favored an outward
oriented development strategy or simply were in search of funds for
construction projects. Reformers also explained that foreign capital would
have a positive. ripple effect, whereby developed urban areas would in time
attract more technologically advanced businesses. 72 As Deng Xiaoping later
reportedly explained "it is necessary to obtain some money by means of land
so that the development of other industries can be brought along, incomes be
increased and benefit can be obtained. 73 Reform of the urban land regime
was considered a prerequisite for the development of the "third tier," or
service sector, of the economy. The existence of a robust service sector was
considered emblematic of advanced economies. According to this logic, if
China's real estate industry prospered, it nearly guaranteed the growth and
success of the banking, finance and insurance industries.74
The debates on the commodification of urban land use rights ran on
until the Thirteenth Party Congress held session in October 1987. In the end,
pragmatic considerations won over ideological ones, as most CCP members
were concerned with finding new sources of revenue to finance development
70 The extent to which China's development strategy should rely upon foreign capital has long been
the subject of much discussion. In the mid-1980s, the risks associated with foreign capital were closely
analyzed and debated. Many reformers believed that those risks could be controlled and were outweighed
by the benefits that foreign investment would bring. A consensus seems to have emerged in favor of this
view by late 1987 as Zhao Ziyang adopted an export oriented development strategy. Zhao's decision was
influenced in part on the visionary plan advanced by Wang Jian, who emphasized the benefits that would
flow from the industrialization of coastal cities and SEZs and the foreign exchange earned through trade
and investment. Wang Jian, Xuanze zhenggui zhang fajan zhanlue [Selecting the Correct Long Term
Development Strategy], JINGJI RIBAO [ECONOMIC DAILY], Jan. 5, 1988, at 3.
71 Louise do Rosario, A Capital Idea, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 15, 1987, at 33.
72 ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN SHICHANG GAILUN [SURVEY OF REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHINA] 237
(Song Chunhua ed., 1995).
73 Xu Xingji, Theoretical Exploration, GUANGMING RIBAO, May 2, 1992, at 3, translated in FBIS-
CHINADAILY REP., June 2, 1992, at 26.
" Policy Framework, supra note 45.
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projects or encouraging higher levels of foreign investment. 75  In the
aftermath of the Party Congress, work began on modifying the legal regime to
conform to the new political reality. At the National People's Congress
("NPC") on April 12, 1988, the Constitution was amended to read: "the right
to use land may be transferred according to law." 76  In December 1988 the
NPC amended Article 2 of the Land Management Law by adding the
following language: "the right to use State owned or collectively owned land
may be assigned pursuant to the law. "
77
B. Financing Urban Development Through Grant Fees
The Provisional Regulations of the PRC on the Grant and Assignment of
the Right to Use State Owned Urban Land, promulgated by the State Council in
May 199078 distinguish urban from rural land and establish two forms of urban
land use rights: (1) "grant for value" (youchang churang), whereby the state
grants the right to use a parcel of land upon payment of a "grant," or "transfer,"
fee (churang fei); and, (2) "administrative allocation" (hubao),79 whereby the
state allocates the land use right free of charge.80 Grant fees vary widely among
urban areas and may be based upon rational factors, such as proposed use,
location, and environmental conditions, as well as arbitrary factors such as the
identity of the purchaser. Some localities have enacted grant fee schedules in an
's For example, Vice Premier Tian Jiyun and Jiang Rugao, then director of the Shanghai Land
Administration Bureau, emphasized the need to raise revenue for the rehabilitation and development of
urban infrastructure. Tian urged his fellow Party members to consider the benefits that flowed from the
Hong Kong system, where the government was enriched greatly by the sale of land use rights, yet still
retained ownership of the land. See supra note 45.
76 P.R.C. CONST., art. 10.
77 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa, Ch. 1, art. 2 (amended 1988), translated in CHrNA
L. FOR FOREIGN Bus., 114-715 [hereinafter LAND MANAGEMENT LAW].
78 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongguan Churang He Zhuanrang
Zanhang Tiaoli, translated in CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN Bus., 114-716 [hereinafter 1990 URBAN LAND USE
REGULATIONS].
" Allocated land use rights have no fixed term, but have limited allowable uses and are subject to a
number of restrictions on their subsequent transfer or assignment. They are typically issued for infrastructure
projects, as well as for utility, transportation, educational, civic and military purposes or other specified State
projects. Id. arts. 43-47; Urban Real Estate Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 23
[hereinafter the 1995 Real Estate Law], translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct 3, 1994, at 23.
80 1990 URBAN LAND USE REGULATIONS, arts. 8, 14. Granted land use rights have fixed terms,
varying according to use, which upon expiration revert to the state. The terms of granted land use rights
range from a low of 40 years for land used in commercial or recreational projects to a high of 70 years for
land used in constructing housing. Industrial and technological uses have a maximum term of 50 years.
The term may be extended upon approval by the state. 1990 URBAN LAND USE REGULATIONS, art. 12.
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effort to standardize prices, but these have not been closely followed.81 Attempts
to standardize and control grant fees on a nationwide basis periodically are made
by central authorities with limited success.
82
According to the 1995 Urban Real Estate Administration Law and earlier
issued State Council decrees, all revenues collected from grant fees must be
accounted for and submitted to public finance authorities. 83  Thereafter, the
revenues must be used to improve urban land or build infrastructure facilities.
84
While statistics vary widely on the amount of revenue that has been collected
from grant fees, those from the State Land Administration ("SLA")8 5 indicate that
44,000 plots of land totaling 79,000 hectares had been granted out by the end of
1993, earning the central government 123 billion RMB (US $14.86 billion) from
grant fees.86 This is significantly less than what was originally anticipated.87 In
some cases grant fees have not even covered the costs of putting the land into a
marketable condition and relocating displaced residents and enterprises.88
Several municipal governments, such as Guangzhou, have been more successful
in realizing gains through grant fees because of more detailed regulations and
enhanced enforcement measures.89
81 See Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Land Prices for Use of Land Granted by Agreement and
Reduction and Exemption of Payment Regulations, translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Oct. 28, 1991, at 54.
See also Shanghaishi Tudi Shiyangquan Youchang Zhuanrang Banfa, translated in CHINA L. FOR
FOREIGN Bus., 91-034, [hereinafter Shanghai Land Compensation Rules].82 See, e.g., CHINAL. & PRAc., July/Aug. 1996, at 9.
83 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 18. For additional analysis of the 1995 Real Estate Law see Mark T.
Kremzner, Managing and Regulating Land Use Rights in China: New Urban Real Estate Law, E. ASIAN
EXEcUTIVE REP., Oct. 15, 1994, at 9.
84 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 18.
" The State Land Administration Bureau [hereinafter SLA] was established in 1986 as part of the
implementation of the LAND MANAGEMENT LAW. The SLA is directly under the State Council, the highest
organ of government authority in China. As explained in Article 5 of the LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, the SLA
is "responsible for uniform management of land throughout the country." It administers state owned land in
urban and rural areas, including the requisition of land and the granting and allocation of land use rights.
86 ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN SHICHANG GAILuN [SURVEY OF THE REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHINA]
234 (Song Chunhua ed. 1995). According to China Daily reports, by the end of 1982 the central
government earned 50 billion RMB (US $8.7 billion) from land use rights. Liang Chao, 7 Cities Chosen
as Pilot for Real Estate, CHINA DAILY, May 4, 1993, at 3.
8' China Real Estate Should Be Under Control. CHINA DAILY, Jan. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Asiapc File.
88 In Shenzhen, during the period 1980 to 1987. grant fees and related charges collected by the
local government totaled 38 million RMB, an amount that did not cover land preparation expenses.
Henry Zheng, The Special Economic Zones and Coastal Cities in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 20-43
(William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1993).
89 Henny Sender, Be Sure to Bring Money, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 12, 1993, at 72-73. By the end
of 1992, the Guangdong Provincial government reportedly earned 9.4 billion RMB (US $1.6 billion) from
land use rights on 7000 hectares of land. This accounted for 45 percent of the annual revenue of the
provincial government. See SURVEY OF THE REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHINA, supra note 86.
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Negotiated grants, which is the way most land use rights have been sold,
have resulted in the conveyance of land use rights at prices significantly below
those that might be obtained in a more competitively based scheme.90 It is not
uncommon for local officials to agree to grant land use rights at lower prices and
then share in the windfall profits obtained through subsequent transactions. 91
Proposals to abolish the negotiated sales method were seriously considered
during the drafting of the 1995 Real Estate Law, but ultimately rejected as
unfeasible. Instead, the 1995 Real Estate Law requires that auction or bid
methods be employed when land use rights are granted for the purposes of
constructing commercial, tourist, recreational facilities or luxury housing "where
conditions exist." The Law does not specify what these conditions are.92 Shortly
after the 1995 Real Estate Law went into effect, the SLA issued procedures to
establish minimum prices for land use rights granted by agreement. 93
Even when other methods have been used to sell land use rights, grant fees
have been reduced in an effort by local officials to attract domestic enterprises or
foreign invested projects. Most municipal governments are eager to have
industries established within their jurisdiction, because they provide a source of
employment, are a potential source of future revenue through the levying of
various fees, and enhance the power and prestige of local officials.94 Localities
compete with one another for the siting of enterprises and foreign invested
projects, which places downward pressure on grant fee prices.95 Moreover, local
authorities have taken a larger share of the revenue acquired through grant fees.
In order to obtain the initial support of localities for the reform of the urban land
system, the central government agreed to share a portion of the funds collected
90 There are three methods for the purchase and acquisition of a granted land use right: auction,
requests for bids, and negotiated agreements. See 1990 URBAN LAND USE REGULATIONS, art. 18.
91 Zou Jiahua Strongly Attacks Corrupt Officials in Land Department, MING PAO, Aug. 3, 1993 at
2, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 6, 1993, at 26.
92 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 12. Several of the larger urban areas, such as Guangzhou and
Shanghai, that have engaged in auction and bidding procedures have the administrative and
organizational capability in place to conduct competitive sales of land use rights, whereas some smaller
cities do not.
93 See CHINAL. &PRAc., Oct. 1, 1995 at 7.94 Larger urban areas are more likely to receive permission from provincial and central authorities
to expend funds to build better infrastructure, civic and leisure facilities, which in turn attracts more
foreign and domestic investment. For example in Shunde, Guangdong Province municipal officials
succeeded in encouraging a large number of enterprises to buy land use rights and set up manufacturing
and assembly facilities. The increase in the municipal budget and population of the city satisfied the
internal requirements of higher level governments thereby enabling Shunde municipal officials to gain
approval to build new athletic facilities and a civic arena; upgrade and widen city roads; and install new
IDD telecommunications equipment. Interview with Chinese planning consultant to Guangzhou
Municipal Government in Shunde (Dec. 1996).
95 See YOU-TIEN HsING, MAKING CAPITALISM IN CHINA: THE TAwAN CONNECTION (1998).
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from the grant of land use rights.96 Over time, local governments not only have
bargained for a larger share, but have concealed from central officials both the
quantity of land granted out and the amount of money or other consideration
received, despite repeated efforts by central authorities to regulate and discipline
local governments.97 The central government therefore has witnessed a steady
decline in the amount of revenue it extracts from land use right grants that can be
used for urban development.
While many municipalities have reduced grant fees to encourage
investment, there has been a large diversion of money away from urban
infrastructure and housing construction, despite legal prohibitions on such
activity. Some of this is due to the corruption of local officials, who
misappropriate and embezzle funds. 98  However, the overwhelming majority of
grant fees have been channeled into other government departments or invested in
local state or collectively owned manufacturing enterprises. 99 Although these
funds may directly or indirectly stimulate growth and economic development, it is
of a different nature than intended. Efforts are periodically made by municipal
and provincial governments to stop these abuses through the issuance of rules
detailing how fees collected from land use rights are to be collected and disposed
of, but with little success.'00  These rules typically require grant fees and an
authorized payment warrant to be passed directly to the municipal financial
bureau, which is to ensure that the funds be spent primarily on land development
and the construction of urban infrastructure.
0 1
96 This is an example of how central leaders garnished political support for their socio-economic refonns
from provincial and local leaders through the implementation of a fiscal decentralization and revenue sharing
strategy popularly called "eating in separate kitchens" (fen zao chifan). The sharing of revenues tilted toward
the provinces over time and left the central treasury short of funds. For a more detailed discussion see SusAN L.
SHRK, TIE POLmCAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (1993).
97 Originally the central treasury was to retain 40% of the income from grant fees, but this has been
reduced to 32%. See The Perplexity Facing Real Estate-Notes on Covering Reform of the Land Use
System in Guangdong and Fujian, RENMIN RIBAO, Nov. 5, 1992, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP.
Dec 3, 1992, at 44.
98 Zou Jiahua Strongly Attacks Corrupt Officials in Land Department, supra note 91.
99 In March 1995, the State Land Administration and Ministry of Finance issued jointly the Circular to
Strengthen the Administration of Collection of Land Use Right Grant Fees. See CHINA L. AND PRAC., May 8,
1995 at 9. On June 12, 1995 the State Land Administration issued the Tentative Provisions for the Supervision
of Land. See FANODICHAN SHENPAN SHOUCE [JUDICIAL HANDBOOK ON REAL ESTATE] (Supreme People's Court
Civil Law Bureau & People's Legal Publishing House eds., 1995). See also Suggestions on Control of Real
Estate Market, Xinhua Domestic Service, Aug. 13, 1993, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 20, 1993,
at 30; Government Loses US $3.5 Billion in Real Estate Market, Aug. 23, 1993, HONG KONG AFP, reprinted in
FBIS-CHINADAILY REP., Aug. 23, 1993, at 40.
100 See, e.g., Rules for the Collection and Management of Charges for Granted Land Use Rights
promulgated by the Beijing Municipal Government in September 1994. The full text of the rules appears
in Chinese in MINO PAO, Sept. 17, 1994, at E-1.
'01 See id
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In addition to grant fees, there are other fees and a variety of taxes
imposed by central, provincial, and local governments on both granted and
allocated land use rights. These include annual land use fees (tudi shiyong
fei),10 2 land development charges, construction taxes and land use value added
taxes. Land use value added taxes are imposed on the revenue obtained by the
owners of land use rights who assign their rights or any structures upon the land.
The Tentative Regulations on Land Value Added Tax and associated
Implementing Rules for the Tentative Regulations on Land Value Added Tax,
promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, detail the allowable deductions on gains
from such assignments and the procedures for payment and collection of the
tax.103 Real estate taxes, based on the assessed value of the land use right and
any attached structures, are due on an annual basis.
C. Land Development in a Market Economy
1. Regulating Urban Land Transactions
The conversion of land into a marketable commodity has posed a
challenge for policy and law makers. They generally believe that a legal
framework that protects property interests and allows those interests to
circulate more efficiently will result in more investments in urban
construction projects and purchases of real estate. 1°4 At the same time
they want to ensure that the state maintains control over urban land uses
and real estate markets. How China strikes a balance between free
markets in urban real estate and state control of those markets is indicative
of the development path it is travelling upon.
In addition to establishing a national framework for the acquisition
from the state of land use rights, the 1990 Urban Land Use Regulations
legitimized the secondary market'0 5 by setting forth the procedures by
102 The annual land use fee is generally a small sum of money paid to the municipality and
underscores the fact that the property interest of the grantee is in the nature of a leasehold. See, e.g.,
Shanghai Land Compensation Rules, art. 2(5).
03 The Tentative Regulations on Land Value Added Tax, translated in CHINA ECON. NEWS, Jan. 17,
1994, at 7 [hereinafter Land VAT Regulations]; The Implementing Rules for the Tentative Regulations on
Land Value Added Tax, translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Mar. 31, 1995, at 23 [hereinafter Land VAT
Implementing Rules].
104 SURVEY OF THE REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHINA, supra note 86, at 240-44; Policy Framework,
supra note 45.
05 The sale and purchase of land use rights from the state is often referred to as the primary market,
whereas transactions in land use rights between the original grantee of the state and another party is
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which granted and allocated land use rights could be mortgaged, leased or
assigned (zhuanrang) by means of sale, exchange or gift. 106 The 1992
Provisional Measures on the Administration of Allocated Land Use Rights
further clarified the procedures for the assignment and transfer of allocated
land use rights. 10 7 While both the 1990 Urban Land Use Regulations and
1992 Provisional Measures were instrumental in unleashing the productive
potential of urban land, they did not purport to create free markets in real
estate. On the contrary, a key role was reserved for the state to monitor
and regulate all land use right transactions. 0 8 Under the 1990 Urban Land
Use Right Regulations and 1992 Provisional Measures, the price and
terms of all land transactions must be approved by the SLA. Furthermore,
the SLA was given discretionary authority to adjust transaction prices and
preemptive rights to purchase, at a price it deems proper, any land use
rights transferred "substantially lower than the market price."'01 9 The 1995
Real Estate Law withdrew the preemptive rights and price adjusting
authority of the SLA, but continues to require parties to a land transaction
to disclose the price and terms of their final agreement. 110 In addition, the
1995 Real Estate Law proposed the creation of a national standardized
appraisal system, under which the state is to formulate measures for
determining the value of land and real estate with reference to local
considered the secondary market. For a quantitative analysis of the secondary market for land use rights
in Shanghai see Li LING HIN, PRIVATIZATION OF URBAN LAND IN SHANGHAI (1996).
106 Article 19 of the 1990 Urban Land Use Right Regulations defines the term "assignment of the
right to use land" (zhuanrang tudi shiyong chuan) as "the act by which a land user passes on the right to
use land [originally granted by the state], and includes sale, exchange and gifts." Assignments of land use
rights are distinct from leases and mortgages. 1990 URBAN LAND USE REGULATIONS, arts. 19-38.
107 Huabo Tudi Shiyongquan Guangli Zanhang Banfa, translated in CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus., 14-
713, [hereinafter 1992 Provisional Measures]. Before allocated land use rights are assigned (i.e. sale,
exchange or gifting) they must be converted into granted land use rights. This requires that a fee for grant
of land use rights (tudi shiyongchuan chuzujin) be paid. 1992 Provisional Measures, art. 6; 1990 LAND
USE REGULATIONS, art. 45; 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 39.
108 The SLA intervenes in the secondary market to maintain higher price levels so that the state can
obtain more revenue from the sale of land use rights in the primary market. The primary market prices
have a significant influence on the secondary market because land costs account for sizable percentage of
the final selling price, depending on the type of project and particular location. In Guangzhou for
example, the price for land use rights constitutes 20% of the final sales price of low to middle cost
housing, and was seen as adversely affecting the supply of housing. This presents the government with a
dilemma and pits the SLA against the MOC. Whereas the SLA desires to maximize revenue from the sale
of land use rights, the MOC wants to maximize revenues flowing from construction projects. See
Guangzhou Risks Investors' Ire by Tackling Land Costs Problem, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 14,
1996, at 12. For a thorough discussion of the role of the state in regulating supply and demand of urban
land see SURVEY OF REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHINA, supra note 86, chs. 2, 3.
109 1990 LAND USE REGULATIONS, art. 26.
110 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 34.
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conditions.11' Despite these changes in national law, many municipal and
provincial land use regulations continue to provide local authorities with
preemptive rights, and these regulations remain in effect.'12
To eliminate corruption and bring order to what essentially is a
futures market in housing, the MOC promulgated in late 1994 the
Administration of the Pre-Sale of Urban Commodity Buildings
Procedures. 3 The Pre-Sale Procedures establish the terms and conditions
for the pre-sale of real estate. Pre-sale transactions must be registered
with and approved by the local Real Property Administration Department
under the MOC. 114  All proceeds from pre-sales must be invested in
"relevant construction projects."' 5  This requirement was aimed at
curtailing the common practice by construction companies of depositing
pre-sale proceeds in foreign bank accounts and leaving projects
unfinished. 1
6
A strong state presence also is evident in the leasing market. In
mid-1995 the MOC promulgated the Administration of the Leasing of
Urban Premises Procedures." 7  These Procedures detail the form and
procedures for executing a lease and require all leases to be examined and
approved by municipal authorities before they enter into effect. Parties to
a lease pertaining to non-residential premises may negotiate freely rent and
most other terms. The rental price and terms of residential premises must
conform to the policies and requirements of the relevant municipal
government.118
During the past several years, new legislation and rules have been
implemented at the national level detailing the procedures for recording
.. 1995 Real Estate Law, arts. 32-33; Liang Chao, Laws To Put Brakes on Illegal Land Deals,
CHINA DAILY, Mar. 31, 1994, at 1.112 See, e.g., Shanghai Municipality PRC Land Administration Law Implementing Procedures, art.
31, translated in CHINAL. & PRAC., Dec. 15, 1994, at 32.
113 The Administration of the Pre-Sale of Urban Commodity Buildings Procedures, translated in
CHINA L. & PRAc., Jan. 27, 1995, at 41 [hereinafter Pre-Sale Procedures].
14 Id. arts. 8-11.
11 Id. arts. 5, 11, 13(2).
116 Louise do Rosario, House of Cards, FARE. ECON. REv., July. 14, 1994, at 54.
117 The Administration of the Leasing of Urban Premises Procedures, translated in CHINA L. &
PRAc., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 36, [hereinafter Urban Lease Procedures]. This national piece of
legislation was modeled upon the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Premises Leasing Regulations issued
in 1993 and the Guangdong Province Regulations on the Leasing of Premises in Cities and Towns issued
in mid-1994.
1ll Urban Lease Procedures, art. 7.
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and determining property titles, 119  settling land disputes, 120  and
establishing security interests and mortgages. 121 The legislation and rules
on these matters aim to improve the protection of property interests in real
property and simplify the procedures for safeguarding those interests to
encourage both foreign and domestic investment. While market
transactions may be facilitated by these rules, the prominent role of the
state in monitoring transactions and resolving disputes is significant.
Finally, in an effort to better monitor businesses engaged in urban real
estate construction and sales, the Ministry of Construction promulgated
the Administration of Urban Real Property Development Tentative
Procedures in early 1995.122 These Procedures require every business
engaged in the construction and sale of urban real property to be
established and approved as a real property development enterprise
(fangdichan kaifa chiye). 123  To obtain approval a real property
development enterprise ("RPDE") must satisfy minimal capitalization
..9 The Land Registration Rules were promulgated by the SLA and came into effect on Novermber 18,
1989. They are reprinted in ZUDCN FANGDICHAN SHENPAN SIFA JIESHI JI XIANGGUAN FALU GUIFAN (1996), at 102.
On December 28, 1995, the SLA promulgated the amended and revised Land Registration Rules, which came
into effect on Febrary 1, 1996. For a discussion of the revised Land Registration Rules see D. Clarke & N.
Howson, Developing P.R. C. Property and Real Estate Law: Revised Registration Rules, 18 E. AStAN EXECUTIVE
REP. 4 (1996). Additionally, the Provisions for Determining Land Ownership and Land Use Rights, which were
promulgated by the SLA and entered into effect on May 1, 1995 detail the principles and methods for clarifying
and determining property rights in land. The Provisions are reprinted in zuIxN FANGDICHAN SHENPAN SIFA
JIESHI J XIANGGUAN FALUGUIFAN (1996) at 135.
120 The Provisional Measures for the Handling of Land Title Disputes were promulgated by the SLA
on December 18, 1995 and entered into effect on February 1, 1996. The Measures are summarized in
CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 1996, at 8; see also 3(8) CHINA LEGAL DEV. BULL. 18 (1996). The Measures set
forth the procedures for resolving land title disputes, first through consultations, and if unsuccessful
through mediation by the SLA.
121 The Security Law of the People's Republic of China, was promulgated by the NPC on June 30,
1995 and became effective on October 1, 1995. It is reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Aug.
11, 1995, at 21. The Security Law sets forth the basic principles and procedures by which interests in real
estate may be used as collateral in securing financing. While the Security Law leaves unanswered a
number of issues on mortgages of land use rights and real estate, it does establish a basic framework that
has been supplemented by central government regulations and local legislation specifically addressing
mortgages of urban land and attached structures. These include the Measures for the Administration of
Urban Real Estate Mortgages, which were promulgated by the MOC on May 9, 1997 and became effective
on June 1, 1997, and the Circular on Issues Relating to the Mortgage and Registration of Land Use
Rights, which were issued by the State Land Administration on January 3, 1997 and became effective that
same date. The MOC Measures are summarized in 4(6) CHINA LEG. DEV. BULL. 1 (1997). The SLA
Circular is reprinted in ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONGHEGUO GuowUYUAN GONGBAO [PRc STATE COUNCIL
BULLETIN], Apr. 21, 1997, at 575.
122 The Administration of Urban Real Property Development Tentative Procedures [hereafter Urban
Development Procedures] were promulgated on January 23, 1995 and became effective on March 1, 1995.
They are reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Oct. 1, 1995, at 46.
123 Id. art. 26.
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standards, have a fixed place of business, and a minimum number of
certified technical and business personnel. 124 The Urban Development
Procedures also require RPDEs to adhere to urban land use and
construction rules. 1
25
2. Discouraging Idleness and Speculation
The conversion of land into a commodity does not ensure that its
productive potential will be harnessed. Owners of land use rights frequently hold
land for speculative purposes, lack the capital to develop it, or may be unsure of
how and when they want to develop land. This is considered neither desirable
nor productive under China's urban land law regime. A survey of national and
local legislation as well as central government circulars suggests that productive
uses of urban land are those that result in the reclamation or improvement of land
and the construction of desirable projects with "high demand," such as affordable
housing, manufacturing enterprises, and infrastructure facilities. 126 The emphasis
on avoiding waste and using land productively is a norm with a long history in
China and continues to be expressed in national and local laws. For example, the
1982 Constitution imposes an affirmative duty on all organizations and
individuals to ensure that land is used rationally, and the Land Management Law
directs all levels of government to implement policies to develop and rationally
use land.
127
124 Real property development enterprises must have registered capital and working capital funds of
at least 1 million RMB. They also must have at least four employees with professional certificates in real
property and architectural engineering and at least two employees with accounting certificates. Id. Art. 28.
RPDEs must be established as either a limited liability company or company limited by shares in
accordance with the Company Law. Id. Art. 27. Article 27 also states that businesses meeting the
description of real property development enterprises that are not structured according to the Company
Law shall be restructured gradually in compliance with the Company Law. The Company Law of the
PRC (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa) was adopted by the NPC in December 1993 and came
into effect on July 1, 1994. It is reprinted and translated in CHtNAL. FOR FOREION Bus., 13-518.
2' Urban Development Procedures, part 2.
126 New Rules Tighten Control Over Real Estate Market, Xinhua Domestic Service, Aug. 13, 1993,
translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 17, 1993, at 29-30; Suggestions on the Control of the Real
Estate Market, Xinhua Domestic Service, Aug. 13, 1993, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 20,
1993, at 30-31 (digesting the contents of a document jointly issued by the Ministry of Construction, State
Land Administration, State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and the State
Administration of Taxation).
127 P.R.C. CONST., art. 10. See LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 3, 4. An example of local legislation
complying with the directions of the Land Management Law is the Shanghai Land Administration Law
Implementing Procedures adopted by the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress on February 4, 1994 and
effective on May 1, 1994, reprinted and translated in CmHNA L. & PRAc., Dec. 15, 1994, at 32.
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To ensure that land is not wasted or lies idle, there are provisions in
several key urban land laws that allow land use rights to be withdrawn by the
SLA if development is not undertaken in a timely manner or if it is abandoned.
The Land Management Law stipulates that land use rights may be revoked if the
land is not used for two successive years according to the approved use.1 28 The
1990 Urban Land Use Right Regulations have a slightly different provision and
specifies the sanctions that may be imposed. It requires the holder of a land use
right to develop or utilize the land in accordance with the schedule and conditions
specified in the land use right grant contract (tudi shiyongchuan churang
hetong).129  Failure to comply could result in punishment ranging from the
issuance of a warning and imposition of a fine to loss of the land use right
without compensation. 130  The 1995 Real Estate Law and the Urban
Development Procedures revised this approach on discouraging land idleness.
Both require development to begin within one year of the start date set forth in
the granting contract, otherwise an idle land fee (tudi xianzhi fei) equivalent to
not more than twenty percent of the original grant fee may be imposed. 31 If
development upon granted land does not start within two years of the start date,
then the land use rights may be recovered by the state without compensation.132
Land speculation has been a particularly troublesome issue for central
level authorities. Speculative activities make it diflficult for urban planners in the
MOC to control development and urban growth, and for authorities in the SLA to
control real estate prices in areas adjacent to development projects. Secondly,
government authorities, particularly those at the central level, are unable to tap
into the revenue from gains earned in speculative deals. Finally, speculation is an
activity that is widely associated with the evils and excesses of capitalism. While
talk of controlling speculation and terminating the get-rich-quick schemes of real
estate developers is politically popular, the results have been less concrete.
Many government and Party authorities at all levels have personal or economic
interests in land deals. They receive kickbacks or share profits with construction
and real estate companies that develop and sell urban properties. 33
125 LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 19.
... Granted land use rights are issued to the holder or owner of the land use rights by the local branch
office of the SLA under the terms of a land use right grant contract. See 1995 Real Estate Law, art 14.
'30 1990 URBAN LAND USE REGULATIONS, art. 17.
13 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 25; Urban Development Procedures, art. 12.
132 The idle land fee and other penalties may not be imposed if development is delayed due to force
majeure, an act of the government, or requisite preliminary work. 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 25; Urban
Development Procedures.
133 Land Bureau Director on Real Estate Rules, Xinhua Domestic Service, July 24, 1993, translated
in FBIS-CHINADAILY REP., July 27, 1993, at 39-40.
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At the 1993 National Land Conference, delegates concluded that fiscal
measures should be employed to discourage land speculation and recapture lost
revenues.134 The Land VAT Regulations and accompanying implementing rules
impose a progressive tax on the revenue or other consideration realized on the
net gain from the assignment or resale of land use rights and other real property.
The costs and expenses incurred in "land development," "construction of new
buildings," and "obtaining and selling the property" are deductible.
135
The 1995 Real Estate Law also contains measures to discourage land
speculation by barring assignments (i.e. sales, leases, or mortgages) of granted
land until at least twenty-five percent of the total amount of investment or
contracted development is completed. 136  For large tracts of land where
infrastructure is to be installed, all development work agreed to in the land use
grant contract must be completed fully before the land use rights may be
assigned, unless the land use right grant contract or allocation document provides
that development work may proceed in discrete stages.' 37  Under the Urban
Development Procedures, a commensurate level of funds may be invested for
each particular stage of a development project according to the schedule in the
grant contract or allocation document.' 38  Thus, when a particular stage of a
project is completed, it may be assigned.
V. ENCOURAGING AND GUIDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT' 3 9
While the legal framework for the acquisition and transfer of land use
rights was a critical step in stimulating foreign investment in urban land
development and real estate construction projects, additional measures have been
taken to specifically address foreign investment. The State Council Provisional
"' According to Wang Xianjin, then Director of the SLA, the Land VAT Regulations were
necessary to recapture loss revenues from illegal land dealings both on the part of local officials and real
estate developers. Land Director Announces Curbs on Speculation, ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE, Mar. 25,
1993, reprinted in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Mar. 26, 1993, at 65.
131 Article 7 of the Land VAT Regulations established four rate categories depending upon the
amount of added value. The terms "land development" and "construction of new buildings" are defined in
detail in Article 7 of the Land VAT Implementing Rules.
136 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 38.
137 See id.
138 Urban Development Procedures, art. 13.
139 There are numerous regulatory issues that are determinative of foreign investment flows, such as
taxation, foreign exchange, and labor. The discussion here is limited to an overview of policies and
legislation concerned primarily with investment in urban land. A full discussion of the legal framework
for inducing foreign investment in China is beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed analysis of the
foreign investment legal regime in China and its successes and limitations see PITMAN POTTER, FOREIGN
BusiNEss LAW IN CHINA-PAST PROGRESS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES (1995).
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Regulations on the Use of Land for Construction by Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures
were an early attempt to ease the way for foreign investors to develop real
estate.140  However, irregular and unpredictable practices coupled with
ambivalent central government officials tended to frustrate rather than encourage
investment n urban land development and construction during much of the
1980s. Local officials frequently used ad hoc methods in issuing and regulating
land use rights, and there were claims that grant fees were determined in an
arbitrary manner.
A significant turning point arrived in 1990 with the promulgation by the
State Council of the Provisional Administrative Measures Goveming
Commercial Land Development and Management by Foreign Investors. 141
These Measures were designed explicitly for the purpose of encouraging foreign
capital to invest in and improve land sites for the construction of industrial,
commercial and residential facilities, thereby boosting local economies. 142  As
one Chinese commentator explained, the intent of this type of law was to change
the strategy of "building the nest to attract the birds" into "attracting the birds to
build the nest." 143 The 1990 Commercial Land Development Measures outline
the procedures by which foreigners may acquire from the state granted land use
rights to large tracts of land for comprehensive development, which means:
leveling, clearing and draining the land; installing utilities, transportation
networks and communication facilities; and preparing sites for various types of
end users.14 4 Upon completion of the work, the land use rights to the improved
land may be either held and managed by the foreign investor or assigned. Many
140 The Provisional Regulations on the Use of Land for Construction by Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures
were issued by the State Council in July 1980. 1 ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONGHEGUO FANGDICHAN FAGuI
XUANBiAN (1979-1991) [1 COMPENDIUM OF REAL ESTATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979-1991)] 30 (1992).
141 Waishang Touzi Kaifa Jingying Chengpian Tudi Zanhang Guangli Banfa [The Provisional
Administrative Measures Governing Commercial Land Development and Management by Foreign
Investors] (hereinafter 1990 Commercial Land Development Measures] were promulgated by the State
Council on May 19, 1990 and became effective that same day. They are reprinted and translated in CHINA
L. FOR FOREIGN Bus., 14-723.
142 In keeping with other national legislation and policies, technologically advanced and exporting
enterprises are encouraged to locate on the developed land. See 1990 Commercial Land Development
Measures, art. 10.
143 Jiang Yaping, Dui Fangdichan Gaige, RENMIN RIBAO, Nov. 6, 1992, at 2.
144 See 1990 Commercial Land Development Measures, art. 2. The term "large tract of land" is not
defined specifically in the Measures. However, the Measures have two separate categories for project
approvals: (1) for projects of up to 1000 mu (1 mu equals 0.0667 hectares) of arable land, or 2000 mu of
non-arable land and within the investment limit of local approval authorities; and, (2) for projects over the
limits set forth in the first category. 1990 Commercial Land Development Measures, art. 3.
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provincial and municipal governments have introduced their own versions of
comprehensive large tract development legislation.14
5
A similar type of legislation promulgated at the provincial and municipal
levels are the procedures for the grant and assignment of land use rights in
economic and technological development zones ("ETDZs"). Designed to attract
export oriented and high technology firms, ETDZ legislation typically provides
greater flexibility on the duration of the grant term, has streamlined procedures
and conditions for the assignment of property interests, and in some cases,
reduced grant fees. 146 ETDZ development generally has been quite successful in
attracting investment.147  By early 1993, ETDZ development had become so
rampant in the coastal provinces that vast areas of prime agricultural land within
or near urban areas had been occupied and developed. Investigations by the
State Council found that many county and municipal governments, eager to draw
in foreign investors, had set up ETDZs without proper authorization from higher
level authorities. 148  In mid-1993, the State Council issued a notice calling for.
limitations upon ETDZ approvals and the strengthening of regulatory oversight
by responsible government offiCials 149 In 1996 and 1997, the State Council again
145 See, e.g., Fujian Province Interim Regulations on Encouraging Foreign Investment In
Development of and Engagement in Business Relating to Large Tracts of Land by Foreign Business
Entities, promulgated and effective on May 22, 1991 by the Fujian Provincial People's Government,
reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct. 28, 199 1, at 46. These regulations were the first such
types of issued at the provincial level after the 1990 Commercial Land Development Measures. For
similar legislation in other provinces or cities see 1,2 ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONGHEGUO FANGDICHAN
FAGUI XUANBIAN (1979-1991) [1,2 COMPENDIUM OF REAL ESTATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA(1979-1991)] (Huatien Consulting Company eds., 1992).
'46 See, e.g., the Guangzhou Economic and Technical Development Zone Grant and Assignment for
Consideration of Leaseholds Procedures Guangzhou ETDZ Procedures promulgated by the Guangzhou
Municipal People's Government on August 25, 1992 and effective on that date, reprinted and translated in
CHINAL. & PRAc., June 3, 1993, at 33. These Procedures repealed and replaced the 1988 Guangzhou Economic
and Technical Development Zone Grant and Assignment for Consideration of Leaseholds Procedures, which
were the first legislation of their kind in China. Guangzhou Jinmgi Jishu Kaifaqu Tudi Shiyongquan Youchang
Churang He Zhuanrang Banfa [The 1988 Guangzhou ETDZ Procedures], reprinted and translated in CHINA L.
FOR FOREIGN Bus., 85,035. For a discussion on the success of the Guangzhou ETDZ Procedures in attracting
foreign investment see ANTHONY WALKER, LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, LEAVETr & BAILEY SuRvEYoRs STUDY 54-56 (1991).
147 See Zhao Wen, Investors Plunging into PRC Real Estate, ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE, Nov. 8,
1992, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Nov. 25, 1992, at 52 (detailing the extent of investment by
Taiwan investors throughout China).
148 Development Areas Under Strict Examination, CHINA ECON. NEWS, May 31, 1993, at 2.
1 49 In mid-1993, Guangdong provincial officials determined to cease issuing permits for
development zone projects. Similar decisions were made by other coastal provincial governments at the
request of the State Council. See Chun Wen-i, Over 100 Development Zones Abolished or Merged to
Restore Farmland, WEN WEI Po, May 27, 1993, at 2, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., June 3, 1993,
at 40; Jiang Jun, Coastal Areas Cut Development Zones by Over 75 Percent, Xinhua Domestic Service,
Aug. 11, 1993, translated in FBIS-CHINADAILYREP., Aug. 23, 1993, at 41.
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ordered provincial governments to limit approvals for the development of
ETDZs.150
A tension exists between providing inducements to investors in the form of
decreased taxes and fees while simultaneously maximizing revenue flows to the
government and avoiding an overheated economy. This tension tends to unravel
in a series of repetitive cycles) 5' Investment activity rises following the
implementation of legislation and policies containing incentives for investors, but
then contracts after officials impose measures to control the economy or levy
new fees.' 52 In the early 1990s, the State Council targeted property developers
with incentive packages including reduced tax rates and land use fees.153 Funds
poured into urban land development projects, but by 1993 slowed as the central
government ordered compliance with the austerity program designed by then
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji.154  Local governments, strapped for cash, levied
numerous fees on investors. In Shanghai, for example, government departments
in 1995 levied nearly one hundred types of fees on real estate developers.'5 In
1997 the Ministry of Construction, in an attempt to draw in higher levels of
foreign investment, called for the elimination of nearly fifty types of fee
collections on property development projects. 156
"0 Fujian Province Campaigns to Tighten Use ofArable Land, Xinhua Domestic Service, May 27, 1997,
translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Part 3-Asia Pacific; China, Agriculture; FE/W0489/WG.
151 See, e.g., Patrick Tyler, China Ends Austeritv Drive in Favor of Yet More Growth, NEw YORK
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at 1; Carl Goldstein, Growth at Any Cost, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 25, 1993, at 16
(describing how austerity measures imposed six months earlier were scrapped and efforts being made to
increase investment and accelerate development).
152 One of the earlier and more noteworthy pieces of national legislation that provided foreign investors
with preferential treatment in this regard was the 1986 State Council Provisions for the Encouragement of
Foreign investment, commonly known as the "22 Articles." Although not implemented for land developers, the
22 Articles promised to stabilize and reduce land use fees for foreign invested export oriented or high technology
enterprises. This and other incentives offered in the 22 Articles helped to bring about an increase in foreign
investment and urban development for several years. The Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign
Investment are reprinted and translated in CHINAL. FOR FOREIGN Bus., 13-509. '
153 Circular on Real Estate Development Released, Xinhua Domestic Service, Nov. 22, 1992, translated
in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Nov. 25, 1992, at 29. The State Council circular called for the development of
urban land and real estate at a faster pace in order to expedite urban construction and economic development.
To achieve this objective local governments were directed to rationally assess land prices to improve land
utilization rates. However, the incentives and preferential tratment offered to foreign investors undertaking
urban land development projects could not exceed the limits imposed by central authorities. See also Wang
Yong, China on Brink ofReal Estate Boom, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 28, 1992, at 2.
154 See id.; Ma Chenguang, NPC Bill to Cool Down Land Deals in Big Cities, CHINA DAILY,
June 29, 1994, at 1.
's5 The fees increased construction and delivery costs by approximately 33%. See China: Excessive
Fees Pique Many Local Land Developers, SHANGHAI STAR, Oct. 17, 1995, at 4.
156 Profile-China's Real Estate Industry, ASIA PULSE, Mar. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS,
AllAsia Newsfile.
JUNE!1998
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Foreign capital has played an important, yet not dominant, role in China's
real estate and property development industry.157  By the mid-1990s,
approximately one quarter of the 20,000 registered property development
enterprises were foreign invested. 158  The amount of foreign funds invested in
urban land development projects fluctuates from year to year. However, the
proportion of foreign investment in the nation's real estate sector relative to
domestic investment rose through the late 1980s, but has held steady through
most of the 1990s. 159 In 1992, approximately US $710 million was invested in
the urban land development and real estate construction sector, which constituted
one quarter of the total amount of funds invested in this sector.160  In 1994,
approximately US $4 billion of foreign funds flowed into urban land development
projects, which again represented nearly one quarter of all investment in the
urban land development and real estate construction sector. 161 The amount of
foreign funds invested in urban land development and real estate relative to all
other foreign invested projects rose significantly from the mid-1980s to mid-
1990s.162  However, the distribution of land development and real estate
construction projects with foreign investment is uneven and concentrated in a
relatively small number of urban centers. 163
'57 Total foreign investment in real estate in 1992 was two to three times higher than the aggregate
levels for the five year period from 1987-1991. See Real Estate Continues to Heat Up, CHINA ECON.
NEWS, Dec. 7, 1992, at 6; Real Estate Sector Appeals to Overseas Developers, Xinhua Domestic Service,
June 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, AllAsia Newsfile. The origin of funds characterized as foreign
invested is a difficult but important issue. Due to the special incentives and tax advantages available to
foreign invested enterprises, many firms in China establish offshore investment vehicles that recycle
money back into China under the rubric of a "foreign enterprise." According to World Bank guestimates
up to one quarter of all foreign capital flowing into China in 1992 may have originated from China and
passed through such offshore vehicles. Thus, the actual figures on foreign capital invested in China must
be discounted bearing this factor in mind. See PETER HARROLD & RAJIv LALL, WORLD BANK DISCUSsION
PAPER No. 215, CHINA, REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN 1992-93, 24 (1993).
158 Real Estate Business Lures Foreign Developers, CHINA DAILY, June 6, 1996, at 1;
ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN SHICHANG GAILUN [SURVEY OF REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHTNA] 95-€i
(Song Chunhua ed., 1995).
159 See Real Estate Business Lures Foreign Developers, supra note 158.
'60 This also represented approximately 6.2% of all foreign investment funds actually committed in
China for 1992. See id; Yang Yingshi, Rulings Stabilize Property Markets, CHINA DAILY, June 27, 1995.
See also ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONOHEGUO DUIWAI JINGJI MAOYIBU XINWEN [BULLETIN OF THE PRC
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS] 10 (Apr. 25, 1994).
161 ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN SHICHANG GAILUN [SURVEY OF REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHINA] 256
(Song Chunhua ed., 1995).
162 In 1992, four percent of all foreign investment was in urban real estate, by 1996 this figure rose
to ten percent. Real Estate Business Lures Foreign Developers, CHINA DAILY, June 6, 1996, at 1.
163 See Ren Kan, Investors Fuel Real Estate Fire in Fujian, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 2, 1992, at 2; Jesse
Wong, China's Residential Real Estate Market Booms, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Feb. 17, 1992, at 2;
Guangzhou Real Estate Attracts Foreign Investment, Xinhua Domestic Service, June 20, 1992, translated
in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REp., June 22, 1992, at 34. For reports on Beijing and Shanghai respectively, see
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The issue of what role foreign capital ought to play in urban land
development is far from settled. While few central or local officials are wholly
opposed to foreign investment, most agree that it needs to be limited and properly
channeled. 64 The reasons for restricting foreign capital are more often motivated
by protectionism than concerns over dependency. For example, some officials in
the Ministry of Construction have stated that they would like to curtail the
activities of foreign RPDEs so that domestic firms could increase their lead in the
real estate industry. 165  Others want to see foreign capital used primarily in land
development projects that would result in either the transfer of advanced foreign
design know-how and construction technology, or aid in solving the nation's
urban housing crisis.
In early 1992, central authorities began demanding local authorities to
place strict limits on the construction of buildings with "limited market potential,"
such as luxury villas and apartments, high class hotels and commercial office
buildings, many of which had high vacancy rates.' 66  These types of projects
were criticized as being non-productive, consumption oriented, lacking overall
market value, and of little benefit for national development. They also urged that
efforts be made to direct foreign capital into housing and urban renewal projects.
In late 1992, the State Council issued a Notice calling for local officials to
provide guidance to foreign investors and link the granting of land use rights to
projects encouraged by the state. 167 This was followed in mid-1993 by an MOC
announcement calling upon all commercial real estate developers to devote at
Lincoln Kaye, Prolonging the Agony, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 30, 1992, at 40; Richard Pomfrel, The
Road to Reality, CHINA TRADE REP., Mar. 1992, at 5.
'64 The rapid rise in the total amount of foreign invesunent in real estate periodically has sparked calls to
reduce the extent and influence of foreign capital in China's urban land markets. See Wu Jincai, Invigorate the
Land, Xmhua Domestic Service, Sept. 5, 1992, translated in FBIS-CHINADAIY REP., Sept. 9, 1992, at 41.
165 Id; see also Ta Tan-hui, China Will Continue to Expand Real Estate Business, WEN WEI Po, Aug. 25,
1993, at 2, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 26, 1993, at 43 (reporting that Bao Zonghua, director of
the State Construction Ministry Policy Research Center, said that while foreign investors should be encouraged
to aid in the development of urban real estate, their role should be limited to large scale projects). See also
Minister of Construction Speaks on Ways to Accelerate Development of Real Estate Industry, CHING CHm TAO
PAO, Oct. 26, 1992, at 4, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Nov. 24, 1992, at 35 (wherein Construction
Minister Hou Jie stated that foreign investment should be involved mainly in the construction of high class or
difficult real estate projects or housing that is sold to overseas buyers).
166 For example, at a national conference in 1992 Zou Jiahua, then Vice Premier, advocated channeling
foreign capital into moderate and low income housing projects. See Zou Jiahua on Housing, Real Estate
Reform, Xinhua Domestic Service, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 19, 1992, at 34. See also New
Regulations for Real Estate Development, CHINAEcoN. NEWS, No. 47, Dec. 7, 1992, at 2.
167 See Guanyu fajan fangdichanye ruogan wenti de tungzhi [Notice on Several Issues Concerning
the Real Estate Industry] issued by the State Council on Nov. 4, 1992, reprinted in ZuIXN FANGDICHAN
SHENPAN SIFA JIESHI JIXIANGGUAN FALU GUIFAN 245 (1996). A summary of the Notice appears in Circular
on Real Estate Development Released, Xinhua Domestic Service, Nov. 22, 1992, translated in FBIS-
CHINADAILY REP., Nov. 25, 1992, at 29.
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least twenty percent of their annual development budgets for the construction of
standard housing, and a joint policy declaration issued by the MOC, SLA, State
Tax Administration and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce
requiring at least twenty percent of the land area used in commodity housing
(shangpinfang) to be reserved for the construction of "low profit residential
housing" (weilijumin zhuzha). 16 8 These approaches to solving the shortage of
urban housing soon were modified out of concerns that investors would be driven
away.
What has evolved over the past few years is a policy and legal fiamework
that provides incentives for investors to construct residential housing, while
limiting those projects that do not advance the economic development goals of
the country. Thus, the 1995 Real Estate Law calls for the state to adopt
preferential tax and other measures to encourage and support real estate
development enterprises to develop and build residential buildings. 169 In mid-
1995, the State Council issued a Notice on the Strict Control of Luxury Real
Estate Development Projects, calling for foreign investment to be directed
towards the renovation of older areas within cities and ordinary housing
projects. 170 Furthermore, that Notice requires all foreign invested real estate
projects involving more than US $30 million to be examined and approved by the
State Planning Commission, while projects in excess of US $100 million must be
approved by the State Council. As an incentive to increase the stock of
"ordinary, standard residential buildings" (putong, biaozhun zhuzhai) as opposed
to "high class apartments," "villas," or "resorts," the Land VAT Regulations.
exempt from taxation the amount realized on the "construction and sale of
ordinary standard residential buildings" where the added value realized does not
exceed twenty percent after the deduction of expenses.17' At the local level there
168 Li Hong, Nationwide Crackdown Boost for New Homes, CHINA DAILY, July 31, 1993, at 4;
Guanyu jiachang fangdichan shichang hungguan gauanli zujin fangdichanye jiankang chixu fajan de
yijian [Opinion Concerning the Strengthening the Macro Management of the Real Estate Market and
Advancing the Health and Sustainability Real Estate Industry Development], issued on Aug. 10, 1993,
sec. 6, reprinted in ZU1IN FANGDICHAN SHENPAN SIFAJIESHI lXIANGGUAN FALUGUIFAN 251 (1996).
169 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 28. Article 4 of the 1995 Real Estate Law requires the state to "support the
construction of residential houses to gradually nprove the living conditions of local residents."
170 CHINA L. & PRAC., Aug. 11, 1995, at 10-11.
"17 Land VAT Regulations, art 8. Article II of the Land VAT Implementing Rules attempts to
define the term "ordinary standard residential buildings," but ultimately provides higher level officials
(provincial or centrally administered municipality level or higher) with the discretion to differentiate
between luxury and ordinary housing.
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is also legislation providing foreign investors with incentives to construct
ordinary housing and improve urban neighborhoods.1
72
VI. PLANNING LAND USES FOR MODERN CITIES
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the State Council and State Planning
Commission determined that the urban land planning system had to be reformed
if the nation's cities were to contribute effectively to the national economic
development effort. 173 As a result, city mayors were given responsibilities for
overseeing land use planning; laws were introduced establishing a basic
organizational framework; urban planning professionals, many who were
castigated during the Cultural Revolution, were politically rehabilitated; and the
scope of urban planning was broadened, thereby replacing the narrow focus on
industrial location which had been the pre-occupation of a generation of
economic planners. From the mid-1980s onward, urban planners and municipal
officials urged that the nation's cities had to be restructured if China was to
compete successfully in the international economy. They recommended
relocating manufacturing and warehouse facilities to the urban fringes,
reconfiguring central business districts, upgrading infrastructure systems, and
separating residential areas from commercial and industrial districts. 174  Similar
172 Shanghai has led the way in implementing legislation and has reaped considerable benefits.
Particularly noteworthy is the Shanghaishi waizi neixiao pingjia zhuzhai fajan shougou guanli banfa
[Shanghai Municipality Procedures for the Administration of the Development and Purchase of Low
Cost Residential Housing Built with Foreign Capital for the Domestic Market] promulgated by the
Shanghai People's Government on August 30, 1995 and reprinted in SHANGHAISHI FANGDICAHN
KAIFA JINGYING SHIYONG FAGUI [Practical Laws and Regulations for Shanghai City Real Estate
Development and Management] 108 (1995). These procedures detail the way in which foreign
capital should be used in acquiring land use rights, compensating and resettling residents,
construction requirements, and the purchase and sale of low cost housing. The annual return on
funds invested from offshore can not exceed 15%. For a discussion of the development and
implementation of Shanghai's low cost housing policy, see Shi Geng, Shanghai Encourages Foreign
Investors to Build Houses for Domestic Sales, CHINA ECON. NEWS, Mar. 28, 1994, at 3; Shanghai
Opens Housing Development to Foreigners, Xinhua Domestic Service, Jan. 31, 1994, translated in
FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Feb. 1, 1994, at 49; Shanghai Urges Foreign Investment in Housing
Projects, Xinhua Domestic Service, Mar. 8, 1994, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Mar. 11,
1994, at 60. On the accomplishments of land development and urban construction see SHANGHASHI
WAIGUO TOUZI GONGZUO WEIYUANHUI [SHANGHAI CITY FOREIGN INVESTMENT WORKING COMMIrEE],
SHANGAHI TOUZI ZHINAN 1997 [1997 Shanghai Investment Guidebook].
173 In 1978, the State Council organized the Third National Urban Working Conference, and in 1980, the
State Planning Commission organized the Urban Planning Conference, both of which addressed the role of
municipal governments in promoting economic and social development through controlled urban growth.
"' See Yang Zhongguang, Chengshi tudi shiyong shidu de guoji bijiao [An International Comparison of
Urban Land Use Systems], in ZHONGGUO CHENGSHI TUDI SHIYONG YU GUANLI [URBAN LAND USE AND
MANAGEMENT IN CHINA] 1-47 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Finance and Trade Economics
et al. eds., 1994). Officials in Shanghai have been highly active in promoting their city as world class
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conclusions and recommendations were reached by the World Bank. According
to the World Bank's published report, globally competitive cities in the next
century will require "vibrant producers' service sectors," and the transformation
of China's urban land use patterns to a knowledge-based economy will "require
an accompanying unprecedented revolution in urban land management.' '175  To
achieve this, the World Bank recommended a series of economic and legal
reforms echoing the prescriptions of the law and development movement two
decades earlier. 176  To date the restructuring of the urban land planning regime
has emphasized a mix of central planning and market measures. The use of law
as a tool to bring order to guide land utilization and implement urban plans is
widely regarded as critical for the development of modem cities. 177  What
follows is an overview of the formal legal framework, and a discussion of some
aspects of its operation.
A. The Formal Legal Framework for Urban Planning
The Land Management Law, Urban Planning Law, 178 and 1995 Real
Estate Law establish an integrated urban planning legal framework that aims
to modernize cities, coordinate urban land uses, and regulate the growth of
urban areas. To achieve these objectives, these national laws attempt to
control the amount of land available for urban development and expansion 179
metropolis. An enormous amount of construction has changed the city over the past decade. Numerous
sprawling and polluting manufacturing facilities have been moved out of the city center, 18 economic and
technological zones have been established, service oriented industries have been concentrated special core areas
of the city, most notably in Pudong, and much progress has been made on improving the stock of housing. See
Shi Geng, Shanghai Encourages Foreign Investors to Build Houses for Domestic Sales, 12 CHINA ECON. NEWS
3 (Mar. 28, 1994) (describing efforts being made by city officials to build Shanghai into an international
metropolis of world standards). See also Pamela Yatsko, Future Shock- Shanghai Remakes Itself as Workers
Searchfor a Role, FARE. ECON. REv., Aug. 29, 1996, at 58.
17 WORLD BANK, CHINA: URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT IN AN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMY, xiii (1993).
176 The World Bank report emphasizes the use of free markets and stresses the need for the legal
system to recognize and enforce property rights. See id ch. 1, 2.
177 See NPC Studies Legal Management of Real Estate, Xinhua Domestic Service, May 9, 1994,
translated in FBIS CHINA DAILY REP., May 10, 1994, at 36; Doje Cering, Thoughts on Actively
Developing Small Cities and Towns, Renmin Ribao, Aug. 4, 1993, at 5, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY
REP., Aug. 13, 1993, at 13; Ta Tan-hui, China Will Continue to Expand Real Estate Business, WEN WEI
Po, Aug. 25, 1993 at 2, translated in FBIS-CHINA DAILY REP., Aug. 26, 1993, at 43; Jiang Yaping, Land
Bureau Director on Real Estate Rules, Xinhua Domestic Service, July 24, 1993, translated in FBIS-
CHINA DAILY REP., July 27, 1993, at 39.
178 The Urban Planning Law of the PRC, was promulgated by the NPC in December 1989 and
became effective on April 1, 1990. It is translated in CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS., 14-535(4).
179 The currently defined areas of cities often contain a substantial amount of agricultural land. Article 4
of the Urban Planning Law defines the meaning of small, medium and large scale cities based on the size of the
non-agnculturally employed population residing within the legal boundaries of the city. Id. For more on the
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and the way in which particular parcels of land are used. The legal
framework evidences the legacy of central economic planning institutions,
where the current urban planning regime originated from. In particular, the
legal framework is premised on the belief that plans based primarily upon the
interests and instructions of central authorities will be closely adhered to by
municipal authorities.
1. The Detailed and Overall City Plans
All municipal governments are required to formulate two types of
urban plans that "scientifically forecast local needs."' 80 The detailed city plan
(chengshi xiangxi guihua) addresses building height, density limits,
construction standards, and the particulars of specific proposed development
projects, including floor area plans.' 18 The overall city plan (chengshi zongti
guihua) addresses matters such as zoning, land use layout, construction
standards, transportation systems and green space.'82 The overall city plan
must be coordinated with several other land management plans that have been
approved by higher level authorities. These are the national land plan (guotu
guihua), regional plan (quyu), waterway and lowland plan (fianghe liuyu
guihua) and the overall land utilization plan (tudi liyong zongti guihua).'8 3
The overall city plan must be submitted to higher level authorities for
approval, thereafter the detailed city plan may be submitted to the municipal
people's government for approval. 84 Upon approval of the overall and
detailed city plans, all land within a municipality must be used according to
the contents and requirements of the approved overall and detailed urban
plans. Overall urban plans are supposed to have a term of approximately ten
to twenty years, while detailed urban plans often are revised every several
years. 185 In addition to these national urban planning law provisions, there
amount of agricultural land contained within cities and the size of urban populations employed in agricultural
production. Anthony Gar-On Yeh & Xu Xueqiang, Changes in City Size and Regional Distribution, 1953-
1986, in CHINESE URBAN REFORM-WHAT MODELNOW? 49 (R Yin-Wang Kwok, et al. eds., 1990)
Igo Urban Planning Law, art 13.
"' Id. art. 20.
182 Id. art. 19; see also Some Problems in the Present Practice of City Planning, 5(4) CHINA CITY
PLAN. REv. 8 (1989).
' Urban Planning Law, art. 7. The SPC is responsible for preparing the national land plan and the
waterway and lowland plan from the central to county levels. The MOC is responsible for preparing the
regional plan from the central to county levels.
184 Id. art. 21.
185 Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law permits plans to be amended partially in light of the
requirements of economic and social development. Amendments that involve significant changes to the overall
layout of the city must be inspected and approved by the relevant people's congress or its standing committee.
JUNE 1998
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
may be locally promulgated rules detailing urban planning procedures and
requirements. While many medium and small sized municipalities have little
land use legislation, most major cities do.18 6
2. Land Utilization Plans
China's current urbanization policy seeks to minimize the growth of
large urban areas and facilitate the "appropriate development" of medium and
small cities.1 87 There are two planning systems that operate to help secure
this objective. The overall land utilization plans are employed to balance
agricultural and non-agricultural land uses and serve to guide the course and
direction of urban development on a larger scale. The "land use grant plans"
(tudi shiyong churangfihua) are more of a micro-management tool, which
serve to monitor specific land development and construction projects within a
municipality or county.
The Land Management Law directs each level of government to
prepare an overall land utilization plan, which must be approved by the next
higher level of government before being implemented.'8 The SLA is
required to prepare the overall land utilization plan at the national level and
plays a key role at lower levels of government. 189 The SLA tends to take a
conservative approach towards urban development and favors restricting the
conversion of agricultural land to urban uses. This is because the SLA is
partly responsible for ensuring that there are sufficient amounts of arable land
available to satisfy the food requirements of the nation. 190 Therefore, from
186 Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen have the most
developed body of law on urban planning and land use. See Some Problems in the Present Practice of
City Planning, 5(4) CHINA CITY PLANNING REVIEW 8 (1989). The leading urban planning procedures and
rules of Shanghai are reprinted in SHANGHAISHI FANGDICAHN KAIFA JINGYING SHIYONG FAGLI [PRACTICAL
LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR SHANGHAI CITY REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT] 122-69
(1995). For the planning procedures of Shenzhen see SHENZHENSHI GUIHUA GUOTUJU YIFA XINGZHENG
SHOUCE [LEGAL ADMINISTRATION HANDBOOK OF SHENZHEN CITY URBAN PLANNING AND STATE LAND
ADMINISTRATION BUREAU] (1996). The urban land use legislation of Shenzhen and Shanghai serve as
models for a growing number of small and medium sized cities. One of these is Zhongshan, which has
developed a sizable body of law on urban planning based primarily on legislation from nearby Shenzhen.
See ZHONGSHANSHI CHENGSHI GUIHUA GAUNLI WENJIAN HUIBIAN [COMPILED URBAN PLANNING
ADMINISTRATION DOCUMENTs OF ZHONGSHAN CITY] (1995).
187 Urban Planning Law, art. 4; KAM WING CHAN, supra note 35, at ch. 4.
188 LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 15.
189 The State Council approves the SLA's national overall land utilization plan. Implementing
Rules of the LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, promulgated by the State Council on January 4, 1991 and entered
into effect on February 1, 1991, art. 12, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS., 14-717.
190 The SLA frequently clashes with the MOC, which generally has a pro-development perspective,
over urban land planning issues. The two government units have had an ongoing bureaucratic turf battle,
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the perspective of national level SLA authorities, the overall land utilization
plans are to be prepared in such a way as to conserve supplies of arable land,
maximize agricultural output and ensure the proper development of non-
arable land.191 The standards and policy objectives established by the SLA in
the national overall land utilization plan are supposed to be incorporated into
the overall land utilization plans prepared by lower level governments. 192
Each year provincial level governments and the State Council establish
quotas on the amount of land use rights that may be granted out by each
municipal government. To demonstrate their compliance with their stipulated
quota, municipal governments must prepare land use right grant plans
informing provincial or higher level authorities of the total area of the specific
parcels of land that will be granted out. 193  The municipal or county level
offices of the SLA and MOC jointly determine the conditions and terms upon
which each parcel of land within each municipality may be granted out. In
the absence of approval from higher level authorities, municipal governments
may not grant land use rights. 194 The land use right grant plan also is included
in the "annual land use plan for construction" (niandu ]ianshe yongdi jihua),
which is submitted to the SPC and made a part of the "national economic and
social development plans" (guomin jingii he shehui fajan jihua). This
arrangement is designed to allow higher level authorities to monitor and
regulate the pace of urban construction and the amount of land consumed for
urban development.
Much undeveloped land at the urban fringe or in suburban areas is
frequently owned by collectives, not the state. Collective owned land is
consumed as urban areas expand. In the event collective owned land is
which the State Council has been unable to resolve. Article 6 of the 1995 Real Estate Law calls upon the
SLA and Ministry of Construction to "each attend to their own duties and closely coordinate and handle
real property administration work throughout the country in accordance with the division of functions and
powers specified by the State Council."
191 See JIBEN NONGTIAN BAOHU TIAOLI SHIYI [AN INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL AGRICULTURAL
LAND PROTECTION REGULATIONS] 1-17 (State Council Legal System Bureau, et al. eds., 1994); TUDI
GUANLI ZHONGDE XINGZHENG SUSONG [THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAWSUITS IN LAND MANAGEMENT] 9-15
(Ge Hengmei, et al. eds., 1992).
192 In this regard, the formal urban planning process tends to be a top-down exercise, whereby local
authorities are to comply with higher level stipulations. This is in contrast to the urban planning process
in countries without a legacy of central planning. For example, in the United States, municipal planning
tends to be more of a grassroots issue, where municipal planning authorities respond to the interests of
local industries and businesses, landowners and taxpayers. See RUTHERFORD PLATT, LAND USE AND
SOCIETY-GEOGRAPHY, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 234 (1996). o
'93 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 9. These plans are prepared by the municipal government, including
the local departments of urban planning, real estate administration, and construction.
194 Id. art. 10.
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required for urban construction, permission must be obtained from the
municipal or county government branch of the SLA to requisition and convert
collective owned land to state owned land.195 In determining whether to
approve a requisition and conversion request, the SLA will consider whether
there are adequate supplies of arable land for local food needs and if the
construction project will have a net socio-economic benefit for the
surrounding area. When more than 1000 mu of arable land or 2000 mu of
non-arable land is involved, then approval must also be obtained from the
State Council. 196 Along with other local government offices, the SLA also
may be involved in ensuring that the land developer pays the requisite
compensation and resettlement fees to displaced residents of the collective
and that the applicant has satisfactorily taken steps to find new employment
for affected agricultural workers. 1
97
3. Implementation of Urban Land Plans
All urban land use rights granted out by municipal authorities must
comply with the provisions of the overall and detailed urban plans, the overall
land use plan, and the annual construction land use plan.' 98  When a
developer or investor, typically a RPDE, approaches a municipal government
to obtain land use rights or permission to use land for construction purposes it
will be directed to prepare and submit a "proposal on construction
requirements for real property development project" (fangdichan kaifa
xiangmujianshe tiaojian yyianshu). This proposal must detail all aspects of
the construction project including land and infrastructure requirements,
building design and the construction schedule. If the proposal is approved,
the RPDE will enter into a "land use right grant contract" (tudi shiyongchuan
churang hetong) with the local SLA office or the municipal government. 199
In addition the RPDE must obtain a "planning permit for land to be used in
'95 Id. art. 8; LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 6. The application of the developer must contain
approvals for the proposed construction in accordance with the annual land used for construction plans.
LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 18.
196 LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 25; Implementing Rules of the LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 21.
197 LAND MANAGEMENT LAW, art. 27-32.
'98 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 9.
199 The land use contract obliges the RPDE to comply with the details set forth in its proposal on
construction requirements for real property development project. Urban Development Procedures, art. 6.
In addition the land use contract contains the terms and conditions for the sale and purchase of land use
rights. 1995 Real Estate Law, art. 14.
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construction" ('ianshe tudi guihua xukezheng),200 and a "construction project
planning pernit" (jianshe gongcheng guihua xukezheng). °1 After obtaining
these permits and entering into the land use contract, the RPDE may begin
construction work. Upon completion of a construction project, a final
inspection is made to determine whether the RPDE has complied with all
applicable land use and planning regulations and fulfilled the terms of the land
use contract. If the RPDE does not obtain final inspection approval, it may
not transfer any interest in the land or construction project. 20 2
B. Urban Planning and Development in Practice
The formal legal framework provides the state with a significant degree of
authority to plan urban land uses. However, in practice the central government
has not obtained the desired planning and orderly uses of urban land that the
formal law seemingly provides. One reason for this is that the interests and
objectives of central government officials differ significantly from those of local
authorities. This has made it difficult for central authorities to secure the
cooperation of local officials and obtain proper enforcement of the formal legal
framework.
Central level planning authorities are interested in city and land use plans
based on accurate local data. They want to more effectively coordinate urban
growth and land use within a broader region. From the perspective of central
authorities, urban land planning should ensure that there are sufficient amounts of
agricultural land available to supply food to urban centers, and that there are
adequate infrastructure facilities for industrial, commercial and residential
facilities. Cities with industrial or commercial facilities that succeed in
generating new jobs may be allowed to expand and convert agricultural land to
urban uses. Those that have succeeded in attracting foreign investment may be
allowed to convert agricultural land to urban uses and establish ETDZs or similar
types of preferential zones. The formal legal framework is premised upon
coordination and cooperation among urban areas. Yet the reality of the
economic reform era is that cities and districts within cities are engaged in fierce
200 The urban planning department under the MOC issues the planning permit for land to be used in
construction after verifying the location and boundaries of the land where the construction project is to be
built. Urban Planning Law, art. 31; Urban Development Procedures, art. 9.
201 The construction project planning permit is issued by the urban planning department under the
MOC after it verifies and approves that the proposed construction project complies with all design and
construction requirements and the provisions of the detailed city plan. Urban Planning Law, art. 32;
Urban Development Procedures, art. 9.
202 Urban Development Procedures, art. 16.
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competition to have domestic and. foreign enterprises locate within their
boundaries and to be connected to or supplied with infrastructure, systems such
as transport networks, power lines and water supplies.
Municipal Party chairs and city mayors pursue their own set of objectives,
which coincide little with those of central authorities. Local officials frequently
manipulate information fed to higher authorities and tailor the content of city and
land use plans to advance their particular economic development and political
strategies.2 °3 The factual information set forth in the overall city plans may be
intentionally misleading or erroneous. Figures on the amount of agricultural and
urban land are reduced in order to prevent higher level authorities from properly
calculating the actual amount of revenue earned from taxes and land use grants.
Agricultural yields might be adjusted upward or industrial expansion and
employment rates exaggerated to justify, or obtain permission for, conversion of
arable land to urban uses. From the perspective of municipal authorities urban
planning is about promoting local development, facilitating job growth and
increasing the status of their city vis-a-vis other political units. Increased status
of a city confers greater administrative authority upon local officials, thus freeing
them from some of the restrictions and demands imposed by higher level
authorities. As a city expands, so too does the political power base of municipal
Party secretaries and city mayors. Thus, for many local authorities urban
planning is not about controlling growth and land uses, but merely about growing
as rapidly as possible.
Local level urban planning also is significantly more political, and less
scientific than called for under the Urban Planning Law. Each municipal Party
chair typically assembles a small committee, known as a "small leadership
group" (lingdaoxiaozu) composed of officials from an array of commissions and
local offices.204 The small leadership group discusses and negotiates a broad
range issues such as where particular industries are to be situated, what land is to
be utilized for agricultural needs, and the requirements and location of
infrastructure (roads, power, water, sewer, etc.) While technical planning
factors, such as environmental conditions or proximity to conflicting uses are
addressed, these often are not overriding considerations. Commercial or political
interests typically prevail. 20 As many frustrated professionals in MOC urban
203 Interviews with urban planning officials, in Chengdu, Shanghai and Guangzhou (July & Aug. 1997).
204 Typically the small leadership group is composed of one or two representatives from the SLA,
SPC, MOC, Environmental Protection Commission, Administration of Industry and Commerce
Commission, Transportation Commission, Finance Commission and Agriculture Commission. In some
cases the Military Commission or Public Security Bureau will send a representative.
205 Interview with urban planning official, in Chengdu (Aug. 1997). In one case, the urban planning
department had determined that heavy industry should be situated in the southeastern portion of the city
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planning departments across China will admit, their technical recommendations
often are not followed. Rather, they receive instructions from the small
leadership group on how the overall and detailed city plans should be prepared.
Afterwards the city plans receive an unofficial approval by the municipal Party
secretary, and sometimes the mayor, and are sent upward for approval as
required by the Urban Planning Law. In most locales city plans change within a
few years, whenever a new municipal Party secretary takes office or other
political conditions change.
Municipal officials also exercise a high degree of discretion in enforcing
city and land use plans. Investors and developers, both domestic and foreign,
will negotiate with municipal officials over such issues as project location, site
layout and building design. Beyond the application and permitting stage,
compliance with the urban plans is more problematic. Once construction begins,
either on a project that has properly obtained all necessary permits or one that
has not, enforcement often is a politically charged affair. After obtaining
information from an enforcement committee, superior officials may decide not to
enforce or prosecute the matter, perhaps because of a personal or political
connection with the violator. If the decision is made to enforce, a negotiated
solution may be reached that permits the structure or project to continue within
prescribed limits. This is such a typical occurrence that developers frequently
prepare a site and pour foundations as quickly as possible, knowing that there is a
strong likelihood that a settlement can be reached allowing the structure to
stand.2 °6 During the period 1990 to 1995, more than two hundred million square
meters of illegally built floor space was constructed.20 7 In mid-1995 the Ministry
of Construction announced that it would launch a campaign to enforce urban
planning in six hundred cities throughout the country.208 More significant than
where air and water pollution from plants would have less impact on city residents. However, the
supporters of a state owned enterprise succeeded in obtaining a site for a factory in the northern part of the
city due to better transportation links and proximity to warehouses and suppliers.
206 A notable case in point concerns the construction of two restaurants and karaoke bars on park
land in central Chengdu. The structures were allowed to remain and be completed, because the
developers succeeded in convincing local MOC authorities that the costs of removal would outweigh the
harm done by the construction. Interview with urban planning official, in Chengdu (Aug. 1997).
207 Yang Yingshi, China: Plans to Govern Building, CHINA DAILY, May 30, 1995.
208 Many of these violations however are not committed by the holders of granted land use rights,
but by the holders or occupiers of administratively allocated land use rights, many of whom are state
enterprises, central ministries, municipal agencies, and the defense establishment. While administrative
allocated land is subject to the requirements of the detailed urban plans, the holders of such land are not
required to enter into land use contracts with the SLA detailing uses and construction design. Id.
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official response is the increase in the incidence of private enforcement actions,
whereby citizens bring suit to prevent or remedy illegal land uses.209
Some of the most serious defects in the urban planning system-have been
in securing compliance with the land supply plans. Over the past decade so
much arable land reportedly has been improperly converted to urban uses that
SLA officials have warned the nation is on the brink of becoming dependent
upon foreign imports of food.210 There are several reasons for the breakdown of
the land supply regulation system. First, municipal governments have failed or
neglected to comply with the land quotas issued to them by higher level
authorities. Second, investors and land development companies simply enter into
deals with collectives or local officials for the purchase and acquisition of
collectively owned land without obtaining approval to requisition, convert and
obtain land use rights through the SLA.2 '
In response to these problems, the SLA, in cooperation with the SPC,
initiated a series of investigations and campaigns beginning in the mid-1990s. In
1996, the SLA and SPC jointly implemented procedures to limit the issuance of
land use permits according to the annual construction use land plan and prohibit
any construction not authorized under that plan.212 To ensure compliance by
209 The most common avenue of redress for individuals or groups (typically neighborhood comumttees) is
under the GPCL. Specifically, Article 83 has been successfully used on several occasions by residents in
Shanghai who sued the city and obtained a monetary remedy or injunctive relief. Interviews with urban
planning officials, in Shanghai (July 1997). Article 83 of the General Principles of Civil Law allows a person to
obtain relief when a neighboring party has caused obstructions, losses or other damages to his or her property.
210 See Ivan Tang, City Growth Eats into Farmland, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 30 1997, at 6;
Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua on Need for Strict Farmland Management Measures, Xinhua News Agency,
reprinted in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, China, Economy, Apr. 5, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File.
211 This frequently occurs on the outskirts of cities or in suburban areas. Generally, once land is acquired
from a collective, a wall is built around the boundaries thereby preventing members of the collective to grow
crops on the land. In southern China, developers and speculators no longer bother to build walls around land,
but merely demarcate the boundaries with wire or rope. In many cases, the persons and families that once
tanned the land are forced off and receive inadequate or no compensation or resettlement subsidy as required
under the LAND MANAGEMENT LAW. For accounts on the decline in amble land and its improper occupation see
Chen Zhiyuan, Study on the Causes Underlying the Loss and Diminution ofArable Land-The Legal Counter
Policy, 6(5) ZHONGGUO FAxuE [CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE] 52 (1997); ROY L. PROSTERMAN ET AL., REFORMING
CHINA'S RURAL LAND SYSTEM 23 (1994).
212 See Procedures for the Planning and Management of Constmction Use Land promulgated jointly by the
SLA and SPC on October 1, 1996. The Procedures, designed to protect the supply of arable land, give the SLA
broad authority to investigate the land granting practices of provincial and local government officials. They also
make provincial government officials responsible for approving projects on smaller areas of land. China
Strengthens Control of Construction Use Land to Protect Farmland, Xinhua News Agency, reprinted in BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, China, Oct. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File.
See also Regulations for the Protection of Primary Farmland promulgated by the SLA on August 18, 1994 and
effective on October 1, 1994, reprinted in Agriculture: Regulations for Protecting Basic Farmland, Xinhua
News Agency, reprinted in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, China, Oct. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS,
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local officials, the procedures stipulate that any government unit that violates its
annual land use plan quota shall have its annual construction quota reduced and
the offending government official criminally prosecuted. In April 1997,
additional steps were taken when the SLA placed a moratorium on all non-
agricultural land uses. Along with the Ministry of Supervision and other central
government departments the SLA launched a nationwide investigation to
determine whether local and provincial officials were complying and enforcing
properly all national land management laws.213  Significantly, in an effort to
ensure the continued flow of foreign capital, the SLA announced that foreign
funded development projects would be exempt from the land use freeze.214
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article began with the proposition that China has been
promoting economic development through the legal reform of the urban
land management regime. Several paradigms on the role of the state in
economic development were presented: modernization, dependency and
statism. China's experience in reforming its urban land management
regime does not wholly resemble or fit neatly into a single particular
development paradigm, but does contain elements of each paradigm.
Over the past two decades, China has purposely used law as an
instrument to transform its economy into one that relies less on central
planning and more on market mechanisms. In doing so it has converted
urban land from a resource distributed by the state into a commodity that
is sold initially by the state and which subsequently may be exchanged
through market transactions. Unlike the prescriptions of the
modernization paradigm, which call for a reduced state presence in
Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File. The Regulations authorize the imposition of idle land use fees on arable land
taken out of production for development purposes when construction work has not begun in a timely manner.213 Extensive investigations into all construction projects initiated during the period January 1, 1991 to
April 14, 1997 were made to deternine whether there was any amble land improperly convered to non-
agricultural uses. In addition local officials were probed to find out if they properly followed procedures,
particularly in regards to the granting of land use rights and issuance of permits for commercial projects,
development zones, and luxury uses such as golf courses and villas. See China to Send Out Investigators to
Check Illegal, Wasteful Land Use, Xinua News Agency, reprinted in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
July 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File; Tom Korski, Government to Clamp Down
on Land Use Deals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 18 1997, at 4; Ivan Tang, City Growth Eats into Farmland,
S. CHINAMORNING POST, Mar. 30 1997, at6.
214 Pan Mingcai, director of the construction land department of the State Land Administration (SLA),
reportedly said that overseas-backed projects had been encouraged to use idle land in development zones, obtain
use rights to wasteland and enter into joint ventures with Chinese companies which could invest their land use
rights. Foreign Funded Projects Set to Escape China Land Freeze, ASIAPuLsE, June 16, 1997.
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markets, the legal reforms provide for a strong state presence. Thus, the
state maintains a monopoly position in the primary market for land use
rights and endeavors to manipulate transactions in the secondary market.
Under this approach, central authorities have succeeded in collecting large
amounts of revenue that have been used to reclaim and develop additional
supplies of urban land, build city infrastructure systems and construct
housing. These achievements bear some resemblance to the statist
oriented development programs instituted in some of the more successful
newly industrialized East Asian economies.
In contrast to the statist models, however, the central state in China
has had to contend increasingly with the challenges posed by local
authorities and commercial interests. Local governments are taking an
ever larger share of the revenue obtained from sales of land use rights.
Moreover, competition among localities has depressed prices of land use
rights in many urban areas. Beyond the sale of land use rights, China's
urban land regime also does not correspond closely with the statism
model. Local authorities have not consistently enforced the substantive or
procedural aspects of the legal framework for land planning promulgated
by themselves or central authorities. The lack of local enforcement is a
manifestation of local economic development ambitions that do not
necessarily coincide with those of the center. Thus, there is a disjuncture
between the formal legal framework for land use planning developed by
the center and the way land is actually used at the local level. Where land
use plans have been effectively carried out, such as in some areas of
Shanghai, local rather than central authorities generally have taken the
initiative and guided the process.
To some extent the dynamics between central and local authorities
are similar to some of the symptoms associated with the dependency
paradigm. However, unlike the dependency paradigm where foreign
capital is considered to be the primary corrupting agent, local authorities
are influenced more by domestic capital and local interests, than by
foreign ones. Most investment in China's urban land markets are from
domestic sources. While foreign capital is encouraged under the legal
framework, local officials frequently give preferential treatment to
domestic interests. Thus, for example, the best building sites in a city
generally are reserved for local land development and real estate
companies. In addition, while local sources of capital are well-known to
local Party and government officials, the origin of what is termed
"foreign" capital is unclear. This is because of the proliferation of
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offshore investment companies and trusts by Chinese enterprises and
organizations. Finally, foreign investors periodically are faced with the
imposition of unofficial fees and charges that tend to negate the
advantages offered under the formal legal framework.
In conclusion, the purpose and effect of the reform of the legal
framework for managing urban land has been to promote economic
development. However, the effectiveness of that framework and the
precise character of China's urban development remain an open question.

